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Abstract
Aspects of behavioral decision-making can be integrated into game-theoretic
models of two-player bargaining using finite automata which can represent bar-
gaining strategies in combination with various behavioral traits. The automata
are used as bargaining agents who must jointly agree upon a fixed allocation of
transferable utility in an infinite-horizon Rubinstein bargaining game. At each
turn, the automata are given the opportunity to accept a proposed portion of
the transferable utility, or to reject the proposal and make a counter-offer of
their own. A round-robin tournament and ecological simulations were run to
explore strategic dominance under different conditions. Principles of bargaining
strategy were discussed and future fields of research explored.
iii
Acknowledgements
First, I would like to express my gratitude towards Dr. Marc Kilgour for his
guidance and support throughout this project. His encouragement fueled my
passion to explore and experiment with new ideas, giving me a much broader
perspective of the field.
I would also like to thank Dr. Maria Gallego and Dr. Ross Cressman for
their feedback and direction through the project for helping me stay succinct
and on-path. Your patience and advice was much appreciated.
I would also like to acknowledge the Wilfrid Laurier Mathematics Depart-
ment for creating a welcoming and supportive culture, encouraging to the dis-
covery and growth of new ideas.
Finally, I would like to thank the innumerable peers and mentors that I have
encountered along my journey who have motivated me to be a better person
every day. Although I do not have the space to thank you all individually here,
please know that your impact on me and my work has been substantial and
integral to my growth and well-being as a person.
iv
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Basic Concepts in Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Preferences and Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 The Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.4 The Hawk-Dove Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.5 Extensive-Form Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Normative vs Descriptive Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Evolutionary Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Literature Review 17
2.1 The Rubinstein Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Empirical Results in Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.1 Perception of Firmness and Toughness . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.2 Strategy Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.3 A Changing Utility Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Agent-Based Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
v
vi CONTENTS
2.4 The Axelrod Tournament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.1 The Tournament Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.2 Tournament Results and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 An Heuristic Approach to Rational Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.1 Heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.2 Biases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 An Adaptation of the Rubinstein Model 33
3.1 Automata as Bargainers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 A New Bargaining Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.1 Defining the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Round-Robin Bargaining Tournament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.1 The Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.2 Preliminary Tournament Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3.3 Thinning the Herd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.4 Tournament Re-Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Tournament Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4 An Evolutionary Look at Bargaining Strategy 61
4.1 An Ecological Modelling Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1.1 Population Change Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1.2 Narrowing the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Ecological Tournament Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.3 Ecological Tournament Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5 Conclusions 79
5.1 Summary of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
CONTENTS vii
5.2.1 Extension of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2.2 Applications of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Appendices 89
A 91
A.1 Automaton Naming System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A.2 Round-Robin Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.3 Tournament Re-Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.4 Ecological Tournament Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B 109
B.1 Automaton Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
B.2 Round Robin Tournament Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.3 Ecological Tournament Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
viii CONTENTS
List of Figures
1.1 Attitudes Toward Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoffs: In each pair, the row player will
receive the payoff on the left while the column player receives the
payoff on the right. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Hawk-Dove Game Payoffs: This is the simplest form of the Hawk-
Dove Game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Simple Automaton Diagram: The automaton will receive an in-
put then produce an output in accordance with its set of states
and transition functions. In this context, the input will consist
of: an offer of pie, the current time period, and the history of
past offer. The output will either be a signal of acceptance or a
counter-offer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 H-Y vs Lo-Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 SPE vs SPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 SPE vs H-Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Lo-T4T vs H-Pro-H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
ix
x LIST OF FIGURES
4.1 Standard Deviation Algorithm Simulation δ = 0.95: In this sim-
ulation, each strategy noted in the Thinned Round-Robin Tour-
nament begins with the same initial population size. Population
change occurs in each generation according to the standard devia-
tion algorithm until a final equilibrium is reached. The surviving
strategies at this equilibrium are those noted. . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Filtered Ecological Simulation δ = 0.95: The surviving strategies
noted in Figure 4.1 begin this simulation with the same initial
population size. The simulation is run according to the propor-
tional population change algorithm until a final equilibrium is
reached. The surviving strategies are ranked according to their
final population size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 Ecological Simulation Results δ = 0.93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4 Ecological Simulation Results δ = 0.95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.5 Ecological Simulation Results δ = 0.97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A.1 Standard Deviation Algorithm Simulation δ = 0.93 . . . . . . . . 99
A.2 Filtered Ecological Simulation δ = 0.93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.3 Standard Deviation Algorithm Simulation δ = 0.95 . . . . . . . . 102
A.4 Filtered Ecological Simulation δ = 0.95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.5 Standard Deviation Algorithm Simulation δ = 0.97 . . . . . . . . 105
A.6 Filtered Ecological Simulation δ = 0.97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Chapter 1
Introduction
This section will introduce the motivation of the project and the basic vocabu-
lary and concepts to be employed throughout this thesis.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
When seeking to solve a problem through a game-theoretic lens, it is important
to establish which game can be used to accurately model the problem, and also
to understand how the analysis of this game translates to the problem. Numer-
ous classic games exist, some of which will be considered in this text, whose
structures often can be adequately mapped to real-world situations. Although
the analysis of these games may provide insight to real-world decision makers,
each game will almost always have some kind of blind-spot or difficulty in map-
ping its analysis from model-world to the real world. As such, the development
of novel games and analytical methods is critical for the continued expansion
and evolution of the field of game theory.
Game theory and similar fields of analysis have typically focused on the nor-
mative or descriptive modes of modelling, concerned with modelling “optimal”
decisions, or decisions that are actually made in the real world. Consequently,
less emphasis has been placed on the study of how decisions are made, which
is particularly important when facing decision problems with imperfect infor-
mation and other such uncertainties. A common thread through this document
will be the focus on procedural rationality in building a bottom-up model which
sheds light on the poorly understood dynamics of complex and uncertain deci-
sion problems.
To this end, this project seeks to introduce a novel analysis of the Rubinstein
Bargaining Game [22] in the hope of developing a new understanding of the dy-
namics and strategies surrounding bargaining-type interactions. Many different
events can fit into this class of interaction, whether in a direct sense or in a more
general sense where the general principles of the interaction (or closely related
decisions) allow for a carryover of intuition and understanding. For example,
haggling over the price of a single resource closely mirrors the mechanics of
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the simple bargaining model produced by Rubinstein [23], whereas negotiations
over a complex array of items may follow a similar enough pattern of initial
stances followed by patterns of concessions that the principles of bargaining can
be applied effectively.
The end goal of this project will be to improve intuition surrounding strategy
selection in real-world bargaining-type encounters and to better understand the
big picture effects of different approaches to strategy selection.
1.2 Basic Concepts in Games
The field of Game Theory is primarily concerned with the detailed analysis of
games so as to understand the optimal decision-making of its players. Games
can range from simple to complex, from competitive to cooperative, stochastic
to deterministic, and in many other ways. In each game, every Decision Maker
(DM) will be faced with at least two choices of action. Analysis of the game
will revolve around what choices a DM is expected to make, and the resulting
impact of his decision(s). Each major class of game will provide unique insight
into rational choice given a particular set of circumstances. The following section
will discuss some fundamental concepts in the analysis of games, the structure
of certain classic games, and the insight to be drawn from their analysis.
1.2.1 Preferences and Utility
For a DM to make coherent and rational decisions, a clear goal or objective must
first be established. Furthermore, to properly evaluate the eventual decisions
that they will encounter, a DM must have a thorough understanding of how each
of these decisions will affect their progress towards their goal. The concepts of
Preference and Utility help to provide a framework for understanding how a
DM will approach decision problems and how they evaluate its outcomes.
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A DM’s preference over the possible outcomes of a decision problem sheds
light on their framework for evaluation. To determine a DM’s preference or-
dering, they must first be able to identify the relationship between each of the
possible outcomes of a decision.
Suppose that the set of all possible outcomes of a decision problem is W .
For every x, y ∈W , a DM must decide whether or not they find x to be at least
as desirable as y. Symbolically, they must decide whether or not x  y. Should
a DM decide that x  y and y  x, then he is said to be indifferent between
outcomes x and y. Should he decide that x  y, but y  x, then he is said to
have a strict preference of x over y, or x  y.
In this document, all preferences will be assumed to be transitive, meaning
that if x, y, z ∈ W , and x  y and y  z, then x  z must be true. The
benefit of this assumption is that it eliminates circular preferences which can
sometimes obfuscate a decision problem. Circular preferences are occasionally
seen in real-life situations and are not necessarily wrong, but this topic will not
be covered here.
Now that a framework has been established for comparing alternatives, we
must now explore the case when a decision problem has risky outcomes. Pro-
posed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1947, von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility is a value function through which a DM can evaluate their
preference over risky alternatives. This utility function provides an understand-
ing of a DM’s personal preferences by unifying the preference for all possible
outcomes under one function, whether they involve different units of measure-
ment (i.e. apples or dollars), or different levels of uncertainty of the expected
payoff (i.e. $0.50 for sure or a coin flip that gives you $1.00 if it lands heads or
$0 if it lands tails). It can be said that a DM makes decisions as if they are
maximizing their personal utility function. The utility function becomes defined
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Figure 1.1: Attitudes Toward Risk
through the revelation of a DM’s preferences, it can not be defined a priori.
A principal benefit of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is that
it illustrates a DM’s risk preference, that is, whether or not they prefer a large
expected value of a risky decision to a lower but guaranteed outcome. Figure
1.1 illustrates the basic categories of risk attitude. A DM who makes decisions
based purely on the maximization of the expected value of the payoff is said
to be Risk Neutral. Furthermore, a DM who prefers to accept a guaranteed
payoff less than the expected value of a lottery is said to be Risk Averse, while
a DM who prefers the lottery is said to be Risk Seeking. The conception of the
different attitudes towards risk in the real world will be discussed in Chapter 2.
1.2.2 The Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium is among the most fundamental tools in game analysis as it
is both versatile and powerful in providing insight into the how a game will be
played. The formal definition of a Nash Equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 1.1. In an n-person strategic-form gameG =< N,S1, S2, ..., Sn;u1, u2, ...un >,
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a strategy profile s∗ ∈ S1 × S2 × ... × Sn is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if
ui(s
∗) ≥ ui(s∗|si) for all i ∈ N and si ∈ Si, where N is the number of players
in the game, Si is player i ’s strategy set, any si ∈ Si strategy for player i, and
ui is the utility corresponding to strategy set i.
Essentially,this means that every player selecting a strategy will anticipate
his opponents’ strategies and that he will select his optimal strategy given that
condition. If any of the players in the game does not select a strategy that
maximizes their outcome, the game is not at a Nash Equilibrium. To make an
optimal strategy selection, each player must be sufficiently knowledgeable to cor-
rectly anticipate their opponents’ moves and thereby select their corresponding
optimal strategy.
Nash Equilibria can exist in pure forms, where strategy selection is deter-
ministic for all players, or mixed forms, where strategy selection can involve
assigned probabilities to multiple strategies. All finite strategic form games
have at least one Nash Equilibrium, making it an accessible analytic tool across
a wide range of games. This method of analyzing games depends heavily on
the fact that each player is able to adequately compute their best response to
their opponents’ strategies and will then employ that best response strategy. If
each player in a game is employing a best response strategy to their opponent’s
strategy, they are all effectively employing a best response to each others best
responses and can therefore not improve upon their outcomes. Since rational
play will not deviate from these best responses, the play of the players is said
to be at an equilibrium. The Nash Equilibrium is therefore most useful for
analyzing simple strategic form games.
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Figure 1.2: Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoffs: In each pair, the row player will receive
the payoff on the left while the column player receives the payoff on the right.
1.2.3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is one of the most famous games in the field of
game theory. It has been analyzed extensively in both its strategic-form, where
the two players make one decision each and an outcome is reached, and in its
iterated form, where the two players are partnered for an extended series of
strategic-form games and the outcomes are assessed based on the cumulative
payoffs of each of the players. Both forms of the game will be briefly discussed
here to provide a basis for future analysis.
Figure 1.2 shows the general form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where
each player has the choice to either cooperate, C, or defect, D. The payoffs
are described as: a Reward for mutual cooperation, R, the Temptation, T ,
and the Sucker’s payoff, S, if one player defects while the other cooperates, or
Punishment, P , should both players defect. The payoffs must satisfy
S1 < P1 < R1 < T1
S2 < P2 < R2 < T2
The choice to defect strictly dominates the choice to cooperate, as no matter how
the opponent plays, the outcome from defecting will always be greater than the
outcome of cooperation. This leaves both players with the Punishment outcome
at the only Nash Equilibrium of this game. Clearly, both players would prefer
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the Reward payoff, yet rational play will not allow it.
The one-off Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be used as a useful tool for mod-
elling simple interactions between two separate parties faced with a choice of
whether or not to cooperate. Examples of such interactions include countries
seeking to establish policy to reduce emissions, or deciding whether or not to
own a firearm. The analysis of this game has helped shed light on the seemingly
paradoxical behaviour of parties who would stand to benefit from cooperation,
but fail to do so.
Although the simple nature of this game allows for its insights to be readily
applied to a wide range of scenarios, it does neglect possible key elements in
real-world situations. For example, this one-off style of game does not entertain
the possibility of future interactions between the players, nor does it account for
the players’ personal interpretation of the situation. Fortunately, the analysis
of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma helps to shed some light on these areas of
uncertainty.
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has been particularly useful in the under-
standing of the development of behaviour patterns within groups on individuals
who may interact on a regular basis. This analysis has helped us to understand
seemingly irrational behaviour patterns observed in the natural world by high-
lighting the benefit of cooperation in long-term partnerships. These ideas will
be explored in greater depth in Chapter 2.
1.2.4 The Hawk-Dove Game
The Hawk-Dove game, although similar in nature to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, offers insight into rational decision-making when two-players enter into
direct conflict over a resource of value, V . Analysis of this game was at the
forefront of the development of the field of Evolutionary Game Theory, and its
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Figure 1.3: Hawk-Dove Game Payoffs: This is the simplest form of the Hawk-
Dove Game.
many forms have been widely used to interpret animal behaviour [26].
Figure 1.3 shows the breakdown of the game, where each player chooses to
play either the Hawk Strategy, and make an aggressive play on the resource,
or the Dove strategy, and make a passive play on the resource. If both players
play Hawk, the cost of injuries from the ensuing conflict, C, will be deducted
from their final payoff. It is assumed that the value of the resource is greater
than the cost of injury. If one player plays Hawk while the other plays Dove,
the aggressive Hawk player will obtain the full value of the resource, V , while
the Dove player is left empty-handed. Should both players play Dove, they will
be able to share the resource equally. If the payoffs satisfy
0 < C < V
then there is no pure Nash Equilibrium in the Hawk-Dove game, but there
will be a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium that is dependent on the Values of
V and C. The mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium sees both players employing
both strategies at a fixed rate to optimize their payoff. If the payoffs satisfy
0 < V < C
then a pure Nash Equilibrium exists where both players play Hawk and thus
receive a negative payoff.
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Although it is represented as a strategic-form game, where both players act
simultaneously, the Hawk-Dove game often models situations where each player
has the opportunity to infer their opponent’s strategy. For example, a bird
puffing his chest when confronted by another bird could be a signal that he
intends to be aggressive, while a bird who hunches in a similar situation may
be signalling that she intends to be passive. In this light, the crucial takeaway
from the analysis of the Hawk-Dove game would be that it is best to be passive
against aggressive opponents to avoid major loss, and best to be aggressive
against passive opponents to maximize gain.
1.2.5 Extensive-Form Games
An extensive-form game is a game in which a player will make decisions based
on the occurrence of a number of events in a sequence. Although it shares a
similar interaction in decisions between the players as seen in such strategic-
form games as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game, extensive-form
games allow for the possibility of players to gain information, for example about
an opponent through the decisions that the opponent makes through the course
of the game. This information-gathering process can be used to inform future
decisions, thus becoming a critical component of the analysis of this type of
game.
A distinguishing feature of extensive-form games is the game tree, a sequence
of decision nodes, chance nodes, and terminal nodes that all stem from a single
root, or origin. Decision nodes are the opportunities at which a specific player
must make a decision which will impact the future of the game. Stemming from
each Decision Node are the possible choices by that player at that particular
time. Stemming from the Chance Nodes are the probabilities associated with
landing at the next node in the branch. Terminal Nodes are found at the
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end of each unique path in the game tree, and are associated with outcomes
corresponding to the play through that path.
Extensive-form games of perfect information are typically solved using back-
ward induction, where analysis begins at a terminal node and the game is traced
backwards through the game tree to the origin by determining what decision
each player would make at each node, given the terminal outcome that would
result from that path. The underlying assumption in this method is that the
players will behave rationally and make decisions corresponding to their optimal
outcome. A sub-game perfect equilibrium, or SPE, is a set of decisions through
the entire game tree corresponding to rational decisions made by each of the
players. This method of analysis may provide multiple SPEs, corresponding to
multiple ways that the game would logically play out, though the outcomes of
the SPEs may differ, with players having different preferences between them.
Players are said to have perfect information if each player is fully aware of
their opponent’s decisions and other game events prior to each decision node of
the player. The assumption of perfect information within a game significantly
restricts a rational player’s options, and therefore the possible outcomes of the
game. Those seeking to model situations as extensive-form games must be
careful to understand the implications of the underlying assumptions and how
they may affect the results from the model.
1.3 Normative vs Descriptive Modelling
Decision problems can be modelled in a variety of different ways, usually depend-
ing on the specific goal of the modelling endeavour. Two of the most common
types of models are normative models and descriptive models. Normative mod-
els typically deal with considering what the optimal decision would be in a given
scenario, while descriptive models seek to describe which decisions are actually
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made by people facing a certain type of decision problem. Both methods yield
insight into the decision-making process and can be used to help guide future
decisions.
Normative modelling requires the usage of a perfectly rational agent, one who
has a complete and continuous set of preferences and is capable of computing
an optimal path of action given the available information. In some literature,
this rational agent is referred to as homo economicus, the economic man, and
a cousin of Homo sapien who is solely concerned with maximizing their payoff.
This representation of human decision-making agents has been criticized for its
ignorance of aspects of human nature and outside social influences, but can
nonetheless prove useful when analyzing decision problems.
Descriptive modelling revolves around the observation of what decisions are
made in the real world and seeks to build a model to encapsulate the under-
standing of human behaviour. The benefit of this style of modelling is that it can
point to underlying truths about certain factors which affect decision-making,
thereby creating a foundation for more accurate models in the future.
Prescriptive modelling lies in between normative and descriptive modelling,
prescribing which decisions should be made given that decision-makers may not
be completely rational agents and can be vulnerable to unstructured outside
influences. This project will take on a more prescriptive style, with the end goal
being to develop a stronger intuition around real-world bargaining decisions.
1.4 Evolutionary Stability
The concept of evolutionary stability relates to the study of populations and
their dynamics. More specifically, it refers to the fitness of the constituents
of the population and the potential fitness of would-be invaders to the system.
In this context, fitness refers to an individual’s ability to reproduce. A high
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level of fitness signifies that an individual is more likely to pass on behaviour
patterns and biological traits to future generations of the population than an
individual with a lower fitness level. Within the context of game theory, fitness
can be simply understood as the amount of utility acquired through the play of
a game by a particular behaviour pattern or species. Given a specific playing
environment, each strategy will be associated with a particular expected utility,
and therefore expected fitness within this game.
For a population to remain at a certain equilibrium 1, its constituents must
employ a strategy that is superior to the other strategies that may be employed
in that environment. If there is a group of individuals employing a strategy
that is superior to those currently in use in an environment, this group would
destabilize the native population from its current equilibrium. The following
theorem explains the conditions necessary for invasion by a new strategy.
Theorem 1. Suppose that a population consists of players playing either strat-
egy A or strategy B, with a fraction α playing A and the fraction 1− α playing
B. After a series of interactions between members of the two populations, the
resulting fitness of the two populations can be represented as follows:
DA = αE(A,A) + (1− α)E(A,B)
DB = αE(B,A) + (1− α)E(B,B)
where E(i,j) is the expected payoff to a player using strategy i in an encounter
with a player employing strategy j, and Di represents the fitness level of popu-
lation i.
If DB > DA, then a sufficiently large bridgehead of players using B will
displace an established population of those using A. For this to be true, either
of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1If a population is at an equilibrium, there is no change in the relative proportions of the
sub-populations (different species) within the population.
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E(B,A) > E(A,A) or
E(B,A) = E(A,A) and E(B,B) > E(A,B)
If a population is able to withstand any invasion of mutants with different
strategies, it is said to be evolutionarily stable. Although the definition of
evolutionary stability does not invoke the notion of rational decision, it does
imply a certain level of local optimization of behaviour pattern. At the very
least, evolutionary stability provides an intuitive sense of how populations will
select strategy over time. The idea of an evolutionarily stable strategy can be
thought of as a parallel to the idea of a Nash equilibrium when the dimensions
of time and adaptation are considered in a game. Evolutionary stability arises
when an equilibrium is reached after every player in a population continues
to play their best possible strategy. This concept will be further explored in
Chapter 4.
1.5 Rationality
The traditional understanding of rationality involves a decision-maker to whom
is assigned stable, complete, and consistent preferences over a range of alter-
natives of which they have complete knowledge. Within this framework, a
decision-maker’s actions can be accurately predicted and understood in virtu-
ally any setting. This definition of rationality enables a rigorous axiomatic
approach to solving games, but allows no room for an unstable environment,
changing perspectives or needs, or confrontation with irrational agents.
The concept of posterior rationality explains intentions via backward in-
duction of an individual’s observed actions. In this sense, a decision-maker’s
actions precede the formal definition of their goals [17]. This notion complies
with Richard Dawkins’ [11] observation of the dominance of memes in both bi-
ological and social contexts. According to Dawkins, decisions and actions are
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formulated through the applications of heuristics, or rules-of-thumb, as opposed
to the traditional conceptualization of purely centralized command.
Although these two concepts do not share a common approach, they can
both be equally useful in certain contexts. For example, traditional rationality
is quite effective at analyzing simple strategic-form games where both players
have complete knowledge of the possible outcomes and of each others prefer-
ences. Conversely, in more complex games where the outcomes and preferences
are unknown to the players, modes of analysis such as evolutionary stability,
predicated on the use of posterior perspective on rationality, can assist in mak-
ing useful predictions about how the game will play out.
Throughout this document, games will be analyzed without the assumption
of strict rationality of the players, either due to the lack of information or due to
the overwhelming computational cost of strategic analysis in complex situations.
The impact of this assumption will be discussed along the way, with the intent
of correctly assessing real-world behaviour and accurately prescribing decision
making strategy.
16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This section will provide a foundation of previously published literature from
which this project will be built. The main concepts to be discussed herein
include the fundamental analysis of bargaining in Game Theory, observed bar-
gaining behaviour patterns within the domain of behavioural psychology, and
the value and applications of agent-based modelling approaches.
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2.1 The Rubinstein Model
One of the most influential contributions to bargaining theory was made by
Ariel Rubinstein [23] in his paper “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”.
In this paper, Rubinstein set out to solve the “bargaining problem”, that he
defined as:
Two individuals have before them several possible contractual agreements.
Both have interests in reaching agreement but their interests are not entirely
identical. What “will be” the agreed contract, assuming both parties behave
rationally?
To answer this question, Rubinstein proposed an alternating-offers model where
two players would make offers to each other with regard to the division of a pie
of size 1. Upon receiving an offer, a player would face the choice of either
accepting their opponent’s proposed division of the pie, or refusing their offer
and returning a counter-offer. The key parameter to this model was the fact that
both players would incur a cost for any delay in reaching agreement. The cost of
delay is referred to as δ, a discounting factor applied to each player’s outcomes
after each round and thus creating the effect of a shrinking pie. Although the
structure of the model allows for infinitely many offers from either player, the
effect of time will force rational players to reach agreement immediately.
The Rubinstein model for bargaining offers a few attractive features for anal-
ysis. First of all, the simple structure which allows players to make alternating
offers maps relatively well to real-world negotiation scenarios, allowing for the
development of a clear and concise intuition around these problems. Another
feature of note is that this model allows for analysis from a strategic approach,
rather than from an axiomatic approach which may produce some seemingly
“stylized and artificial results” [23]. By modelling the bargaining process as a
strategic-form game, a deeper analysis can be performed by analyzing the indi-
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vidual decisions of the players. Finally, the model offers as a key insight that
an individual’s bargaining power rests in their patience. If a player faces strict
penalties for delaying an agreement, they will be forced to accept a smaller por-
tion of the pie than their more patient counterpart. In this case, a more patient
bargainer is a player who has a higher δ value than their opponent. Altogether,
these features of the Rubinstein model have made it an excellent platform for
bargaining analysis.
Now that the structure of the game has been defined, it is possible to explore
how the game will be played. In this model, one player (Player 1) is chosen to
make the first offer while the other player (player 2) gets to decide whether to
accept Player 1’s division of the pie. Players can make offers at times in the set
T = 0, 1, 2, .... Any offer is of the form (x1, x2) where xi signifies the portion of
the pie to be received by Player i. These offers must satisfy
X={(x1, x2) ∈ R : x1 + x2 = 1 and xi > 0 for i=1,2}
The basic framework of the game is predicated on the following assumptions,
where x, y ∈ X are allocations of the pie to be received by the player and t, s ∈ T
are discrete points of time when a bargaining agreement can be made :
“(A-1) Pie is desirable (for any t ∈ T and x, y ∈ X, (x, t)  (y, t) if and only if
x > y)
(A-2) Time is valuable (for any t, s ∈ T and x ∈ X, (x, t)  (x, s) if t < s, and
with strict preference if x > 0)
(A-3) Continuity (Let {(xn, tn)}∞n=1 and {(yn, sn)}∞n=1 be convergent
sequences of members of X × T∞ with limits (x, t) and (y, s), respectively.
Then (x, t) i (y, s) whenever (xn, tn) i (yn, sn) for all n)
(A-4) Stationarity (the preference of (x, t) over (y, t+ 1) is independent of t)
(A-5) The larger the portion, the more compensation a player needs for a
delay of one period to be immaterial to him” [20]
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A point of note here is that the preferences of the players over the partitioning
of the pie are diametrically opposed as any increase in pie for one player will
result in a proportional decrease for the other player. Although the players
are selfishly motivated to maximize the amount of pie they receive, they are
indirectly motivated to cooperate to ensure that the time-discounting effect
does not significantly erode their share of the pie .
As such, the strategies employed in this game involve actions to be made at
every possible node in the game. That is, a player will know what their next offer
would be should their opponent reject their current offer. Using this knowledge,
a player will always accept an offer that is greater to or equal than their next
offer discounted by one time period, which is equivalent to the following, where
xti is the received offer of the pie at time period t, x
t+1
i is the offer that the
player would make in the next time period, and δ is the discount factor.
xti  xt+1i × δ
If the current offer does not satisfy this inequality, the offer will be rejected and
the player will counter-offer with xt+1i .
2.2 Empirical Results in Bargaining
To optimize the procedural rationality involved in bargaining, a basis must first
be established which explains empirically observed behaviour patterns in this
domain. This section will discuss some of the documented components of human
decision-making involved in bargaining games, how these components interact,
and the consequent experimental outcomes when the components are analyzed.
Although the procedures of decision-making here are not likely to be optimal, it
is important to first establish a descriptive model of human bargaining behaviour
before proposing a normative model.
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In common bargaining games in the real world, players have limited infor-
mation regarding their opponent’s preferences and preferred strategies. In fact,
it is often advantageous for players to minimize the information available to
their opponent in an effort to maximize their bargaining power. Consequently,
players must possess mechanisms through which to make quick and effective
decisions given imperfect information. These mechanisms, or heuristics, are
shared by many players and thus lead to similar but not parallel behaviour
patterns. Heuristics can be used to solve such problems as strategy inference,
best response approximation, and preference ordering. The following sections
explore some of these common heuristics and discuss their value in bargaining
games.
2.2.1 Perception of Firmness and Toughness
Of principal importance in bargaining is the ability to discern an opponent’s so-
called bargaining-power. In the Rubinstein model, a player’s bargaining power is
completely described by their discount for time, where the player who can afford
to be more patient has the upper hand in the game. In real-world bargaining
scenarios, additional confounding factors influence a player’s bargaining power,
some of which may be unknown or unknowable. Therefore, players must have
some form of procedure for inferring their opponent’s bargaining power so as to
correctly formulate their strategy. To do so, players may rely on a perception
of opponent “toughness” as a proxy to their bargaining power.
Perceptions of an opponent’s bargaining position can be generated through
a number of different means, including reputation, initial stance, and concession
behaviour [5, 27, 28]. It has been shown that bargainers with reputations for
being tough can find themselves in situations with a self-fulfilling prophecy,
where negotiations may break down due to perceived unfairness, or result in a
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poor outcome due to excessive bargaining friction [28]. Conversely, a pattern of
“tough” tactics may incite an opponent to concede rapidly, resulting in a better
bargaining outcome [5, 27]. The resulting intuition is that a bargainer’s strategy
is dictated by their confidence, which is in turn a product of how they mentally
frame the situation [19]. Therefore, to better predict bargaining outcomes, an
effort must be made to understand a bargainer’s perception of their situation.
Clearly, the perception of an opponent’s bargaining power will have an effect
on strategy selection and the eventual outcome of the bargaining game. Any
attempt to model bargaining where there is incomplete information about the
players’ preferences and strategies must therefore incorporate some form of in-
ference mechanism through which a player can gather information about their
opponent and adjust their behaviour accordingly.
2.2.2 Strategy Adjustment
Since the information available to a player may change throughout a bargaining
game, it is fair to assume that their strategy will adapt accordingly. These
adaptations seem to be in part driven by a social norm for reciprocity, where
a player will be more willing to make larger concessions if they get the sense
that their opponent is playing “nice” with them [5]. Should both players adopt
this behaviour pattern, a positive-feedback cycle will ensue with both players
making large concessions until agreement is reached. However, “rewarding” an
opponent for concessionary behaviour can have unintended effects which lead
to worse outcomes. Research has shown that bargainers on the receiving end
of concessions may receive a confidence boost and therefore adopt less friendly
tactics to take advantage of their opponent’s accommodating behaviour [16, 27].
This represents a dichotomy similar to that seen in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, where the incentive for cooperation is counter-balanced by an aversion to
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being taken advantage of.
To contend with this behaviour, bargainers may adapt different concession
strategies in an attempt to elicit greater concessions from their opponent. In
addition, pattern recognition would become an important aspect of their be-
haviour to ensure a best-response to the opponent’s own concession patterns.
In this case, concession patterns could be seen as an attempt to communicate
information between bargainers, but the credibility of this information would re-
main uncertain. Strategy selection should therefore entail some form of decision
mechanism which interprets an opponent’s intentions through their actions.
2.2.3 A Changing Utility Function
A typical assumption in the usual normative analysis of bargaining is that each
player is equipped with a defined and unchanging utility function through which
to evaluate the potential outcomes in the game. Although this assumption
allows for a more rigorous and complete analysis, it does not carry over to the
real world, where players are subject to alter their aims through the course of a
game. To more accurately model a player’s decision-making, a closer look must
be made at the driving force of their outcome-evaluation process.
The common framework in the field of psychology which most closely re-
sembles the utility function optimization framework is the level of aspiration. A
player’s level of aspiration can be understood as the measure of their perceived
entitlement to the outcomes in the game. From this perspective, the player’s
aspiration level will therefore guide their decisions throughout a game, similar
to how a game theorist would view a player to reference their utility function
to guide their play [24].
The key difference between level of aspiration and utility theory is that level
of aspiration can often be a fluid concept, subject to change with new infor-
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mation or an altered perspective. Level of aspiration will dictate initial offers
in a bargaining context, but is subject to change throughout the game in re-
sponse to an opponent’s behaviour [16]. Factors such as bargainer confidence
and opponent concession patterning can have an effect on a player’s level of
aspiration, with decreased self-confidence in bargaining and perceivably tough
concessions from the opponent leading to a decrease in entitled or desired out-
come. Seemingly, as more information becomes available to the players, they
update their beliefs about their value of the outcomes to accommodate their
new-found perspective.
This updating process has a distinct effect on decision-making, as a player
is essentially approaching each decision within a game with a potentially differ-
ent utility function. This method of decision-making can produce results quite
different than those obtained through an analysis involving utility theory anal-
ysis and could be responsible for seemingly irrational behaviour in real-world
bargaining.
2.3 Agent-Based Modelling
Agent-based modelling is a method of system analysis based around the inter-
actions of autonomous agents at the most basic level of the system. In essence,
it is a bottom-up way of looking at a system, enabling observers to under-
stand how seemingly minute dynamics at its lowest level will affect the entire
system. Often, simple mechanics at the base level of a system will lead to com-
plex dynamics at its highest level, making this bottom-up approach a necessary
consideration in many modelling undertakings. Agent-based modelling is often
found in the study of ecology and is becoming popular in the fields of economics
and political science.
An agent-based model begins with the elaboration of a set of rules and
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assumptions that will govern the limits of the behaviour of the agents within
the model. These rules are typically concerned with the mechanics of how
agents interact, and basic structures of the model, such as how to dictate the
passage of time or the accumulation of resources. Subsequently, agents will be
programmed with a fixed set of instructions of how they must interact within
the model. These instructions can be different for any of the agents within the
model and they can range in complexity depending on the goals of the model.
Once the structure and behaviours of the agents have been established, their
interactions can be simulated, thus inducing a range of dynamics at all levels of
the system.
By endowing independent agents with a set of instructions which completely
govern their interactions, it is possible to correlate the macro-dynamics of a
system directly to the mechanics of the individual agents. This approach has
been used in a wide range of fields, from infectious disease and genetic modelling,
to macroeconomic and political action modelling [2]. In addition, the inherent
structure of agent-based models is compatible with machine learning techniques
that can deepen the level of analysis and expand the domain of study, as in the
work of Herbert Simon [25]. By focusing on how certain dynamics arise in a
system rather than what those dynamics are, a more complete perspective can be
created, allowing for a more intuitive understanding of the system and its future
behaviour. Furthermore, this modelling approach allows analysts to substitute
the assumption of optimal equilibrium behaviour with the bounded rationality1
of the agents. As a consequence, the departure of an agent’s behaviour from
normative models can be explained by an emergent procedural rationality from
players in a game.
This style of modelling is particularly useful for analyzing high-order patterns
1Bounded rationality is the idea that an agent is limited in its decision-making with respect
to cognitive processing abilities, available information, and/or time with which to make the
decision
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in complex systems. By simulating the interactions of individually motivated
agents, it is possible to observe the emergence of more complex dynamics and
better understand their cause-and-effect relationship. Furthermore, agent-based
modelling allows for space to test the sensitivity of model parameters and the
robustness of observed patterns or equilibria. By building models from the
ground up, researchers can gain deeper insight into complex phenomena by
better understanding the underlying driving factors.
2.4 The Axelrod Tournament
In 1980, Robert Axelrod [3] ran a tournament for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game in which the entrants were computer programs submitted by some of the
top minds in the world in the fields of mathematics, psychology, and political
science. These computer programs were pre-set decision rules for the playing of
an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In his tournament, Axelrod had every one
of the programs play each other in a round-robin style tournament 2 to deter-
mine which decision rule represented the best strategy for playing the iterated
game. The results of each match-up were added up to determine a strategy’s
total score. The tournament broke new ground in not just its approach, but
also in its implications about the natural trend towards cooperation in natural
systems, quickly becoming a cornerstone work in the field of game theory and
social sciences.
2.4.1 The Tournament Approach
In an attempt to determine the best strategy for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, Axelrod solicited strategies from a range of experts in different disciplines
2A round-robin tournament is a contest in which every player plays each of the other
players in a game.
2.4. THE AXELROD TOURNAMENT 27
for his tournament. Due to the complex nature of the iterated game, a clean
analytic solution was not viable, making the crowd-sourcing effort for effective
strategies a worthwhile endeavour. Axelrod hoped that by casting a wide net
that would capture a diverse group of strategies, selective pressures would pro-
duce a clear winner and therefore dominant strategy in the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game.
This tournament approach for solving the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
can be understood as an agent-based model, where agents of bounded rational-
ity and behaviour interact in a pre-determined fashion. The structure of the
tournament had each decision rule play the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
against each other decision rule, including itself, one time. After all of the games
had been played, each of the entrant’s total scores were averaged over their num-
ber of games played and they were ranked according to their performance. This
procedure benefited the analysis of the robustness of the performance of each
of the decision rules as their performance was weighted equally against each of
its opponents. Through analysis of the average scores and of the outcomes of
individual matchups, conclusions were drawn about the validity of the strategies
themselves and the dynamics of their interactions.
To expand upon the results of the round-robin tournament, the same decision
rules were then entered into an ecological model 3 to further evaluate their
performance. Although an ecological model would typically be used to model the
spread of genetic patterns through a population, this approach can be extended
to include strategy selection as well, since it is reasonable to assume that poor-
performing strategies would be rejected in favour of better performing strategies
3The ecological style model is an agent-based model which allows agents to interact through
a game. As the games are played, the model tracks the success of the agents through their
relative population changes in the model. A simple example of this kind of model is a scenario
where there are chipmunks and squirrels competing for nuts in a forest. If the chipmunks are
better at finding nuts, the chipmunk population will increase, while the squirrel population
will decrease.
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over the course of time. Consequently, this approach would quickly highlight
which strategies were truly the best, as they would have to out-perform similarly
competent strategies, rather than taking advantage of weaker ones.
The ecological model took an equal number of agents representing each of
the strategies from the round-robin tournament and placed them in a simu-
lated ecosystem where they would be matched up to play the iterated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game. The probability of being matched up with an agent of a
particular strategy would be proportional to the population size of the agents
representing that strategy. In each generation of this model, the expected score
of each decision rule, or its “fitness”, would be calculated and the population
sizes of each of the decision rules would be proportional to its fitness from the
previous generation. Consequently, if a decision rule is performing poorly, it
will be less represented in future generations, while better performing decision
rules will see greater relative representation in the population. Over time, the
environment would be expected to settle towards a final equilibrium, where the
best strategies are the most represented within the population.
2.4.2 Tournament Results and Implications
Multiple versions of the computer tournament were run by Axelrod, begin-
ning with his initial round-robin tournament, and followed by expanded round-
robin tournaments and ecological tournaments. Each of these tournaments con-
sisted of the same procedure of simulating extensive iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games between a diverse group of computer programs representing strategies
with which to play the game.
The most noteworthy outcome from the tournaments that Axelrod ran using
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma was the outstanding performance of the Tit-
For-Tat decision rule, submitted by Anatol Rapoport[3]. Tit-For-Tat was one of
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the simpler programs submitted to the computer tournament, a rule that would
Cooperate in the first game, then mirror its opponent’s previous move in every
subsequent game. The Tit-For-Tat strategy was described as nice, provocable,
fair, and clear, meaning that it would initially cooperate, it would retaliate if
mistreated, it would not seek a payoff greater than its reasonable share, and it
would be obvious in its intentions. These characteristics were also observed in
other decision rules that performed well, but Tit-For-Tat best encapsulated and
employed all of these ideas.
Overall, these tournaments were able to justify how cooperation would arise
organically and rationally within natural environments, even when there could
exist a temptation for selfish behaviour. Although the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game can not capture many of the complexities of the real world due to its sim-
ple structure, the key intuitions that come from it can help guide real-world
understanding and policy.
2.5 An Heuristic Approach to Rational Choice
Although much of the literature on decision theory is predicated on the assump-
tion that people will make rational choices unless compromised by emotional or
environmental factors, it has been shown that this assumption can fail in prac-
tice, leading to seemingly unexplained and irrational choices. Over the course
of a few decades, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman caused a massive shift
in the field of decision theory by showing through experiments how the default
state of human decision making fails to match with the once common notion of
the rational decision maker, or homo economicus [15]. Rather, people typically
rely on a complex and integrated system of rules-of-thumb, or heuristics, to for-
mulate decisions in situations where rational choice would be computationally
costly. This system of heuristics is ear-marked by a few key features that create
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recognizable departures from the common rational decision theory, leading to
decidedly divergent decision outcomes.
2.5.1 Heuristics
The process through which humans process information and reach decisions
remains far from a settled science, but experimentation has led to the discovery
of a number of patterns in processing and thought. When compared to other
processors of information such as computers, humans possess very weak short-
term memory skills, but extensive and somewhat mysterious abilities to access
information stored in long-term memory. This observation is compatible with
empirical evidence in psychology which suggests that often-times an individual
will unconsciously avoid making difficult mental computations by substituting in
a more simple and comparable problem to solve, as shown on numerous occasions
by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky [15, 29]. Although this substitution
clearly diverges from the practices of homo economicus, it must be contended
with to establish a firm foundation of the decision-making process.
Employing heuristics in decision-making involves breaking down a complex
problem into a series of much simpler problems that can be easily solved with
readily available information. Although this method decreases computation
time, it may disregard critical aspects of the original problem, leading to po-
tential gross oversights or missteps in decision-making. Fortunately, through
selective pressures over the course of time, these heuristics have been refined
so as to produce favourable outcomes in most settings. Therefore, by acknowl-
edging that a substitution has been made from the original problem, decision
problems can be better understood by analyzing the heuristics that make up
the driving force of the real computation being performed.
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2.5.2 Biases
It has been shown that an heuristical approach to problem solving can produce
favourable results, but it is of great importance to understand its possible short-
comings. When a complex problem is substituted for a simpler one, the decrease
in resolution can create blind-spots in the decision-making process. These blind-
spots are inherent in the structure of the heuristic framework and, over time,
will create chronic biases in decision-making. When viewed through the lens of
rational choice, these blind-spots may appear to be inexplicable and irrational
behaviour, while in actual fact they are simply categorizable side-effects of the
working system of the human mind. Proper understanding and awareness of
biases is critical for the employment of this decision-making framework.
Much literature has been directed towards recognizing and understanding
the effects of a growing list of cognitive biases, and most of those will not be
discussed here. Although many of these biases have profound effects in the real
world, a few are particularly noteworthy in the field of decision-making, and in
particular, bargaining.
Of particular interest in the area of evaluating preferences and utility are
the biases of the framing effect and the anchoring effect. Framing relates to
how the same set of information may be interpreted differently given different
accompanying contextual information [15, 19]. For example, the derivation of a
utility function may be affected by a perceived adversarial relationship with a
bargaining opponent, thus leading to decisions which diverge from the normally
prescribed rational choice theory. Similarly, the anchoring effect describes how
an individual’s preferences may be involuntarily altered by contextual informa-
tion that may not be directly relevant to the decision problem which they face.
An obvious example of this can often be seen in marketplace haggling, where
the seller establishes an outrageously high initial price for the good that they are
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selling. Although the buyer may not be fully aware of it, this outrageous price
demand can impact their evaluation of the value of the seller’s good, leading to
different haggling scenarios than would have performed had they not been ex-
posed to the seller’s initial offer. This initial offer can act as an anchor for future
offers, even though it was clearly never a viable outcome in the bargaining effort.
The anchoring effect plays well into the critique of Nash’s [18] fourth axiom in
his bargaining solution, the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Although
in his theory a non-viable offer should have no impact on the final outcome,
many have criticized Nash’s approach for being overly artificial and failing to
translate to real-world scenarios. For a theory of bargaining to accurately map
to real-world behaviour, it must account for the potential biases involved in the
formulation of preferences and value functions.
When analyzing the cooperative aspect of bargaining, it is important to
consider the possibility of noise created by the endowment effect or the zero-sum
effect. Respectively, they are the tendency of individuals to over-value property
that they feel entitled to, and the tendency to frame interactions as zero-sum
endeavours. Bargaining is inherently a positive-sum enterprise where neither
party can claim to “own” any of the positive benefits, yet it has been observed
that decision-making practices can suffer from the skewed framing caused by
inherent biases, as shown in work by Fiegenbaum, Hart, and Schendel [12].
Chapter 3
An Adaptation of the
Rubinstein Model
This section will include the proposal of a new bargaining game and an approach
through which to analyze strategy selection for the game. Here, the game will
be defined, a set of possible strategies introduced and tested, and the results
discussed. For a complete set of results and explanation of the naming system
for the strategies, see Appendices A.1, A.2, and A.3.
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In this project, the crucial departure from the classical analysis of Rubin-
stein’s bargaining model will be the usage of automata as the primary players in
an agent-based model. The purpose of employing an agent-based model is not
just to make more accurate predictions about future bargaining interactions,
but more so to gain a deeper insight into the underlying principles involved in
this style of game. While the assumption of purely rational choice can be useful
for normative modelling, a model driven by independent agents with bounded
rationality1 can offer deeper insights into how the world actually is, as opposed
to what it ought to be.
This new model will not incorporate the traditional assumptions of ratio-
nal choice and perfect information that are typically found in game theoretic
analysis. Rather, the agents in the model will be provided with a bounded
rationality and access to limited information surrounding their decisions. This
approach has been used to analyze the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and similar
games of social interaction to great effect [3, 2]. The goal is that this style
of modelling will provide deeper insight into how and why decisions might be
made in a bargaining game and provide a better intuition with which to analyze
bargaining-type scenarios in the future.
3.1 Automata as Bargainers
This project will employ agents of bounded rationality to represent players in
the Rubinstein bargaining game. These agents can be represented as automata,
simple machines that are governed by distinct rule sets or instructions that can
interact with other such machines. Whereas much of the previous research in the
field of bargaining has focused its analyses on how preference of outcomes affect
1Bounded rationality is the idea that an agent will make decisions with limited cognitive
processing abilities and/or access to information. Their decisions are therefore rational, but
only within the bounds of the computing power and information that they have access to.
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the final results, this approach will allow for analysis of the procedural rationality
of the players, where the primary concern is the rationality of the procedure
used to reach a decision, as opposed to the rationality of the decision itself [30].
By understanding what may cause the actions in a bargaining game, it may
be possible to more accurately predict the outcomes of future games [25, 17].
Therefore, in this project, structures of decision-making will be programmed
into finite automata so analysis can be made of their playing of the Rubinstein
bargaining game.
By using automata to represent bargaining strategies, certain assumptions
may be eliminated that would typically be used to analyze the outcomes of a
bargaining game. Since the automata will only make decisions based on the
input that they receive and their decision-making structure, it is not necessary
to assume that they are rationally optimizing their utility function through
their play. In fact, it is not necessary to assume that they have a distinct utility
function as their decision-making process makes no reference to such a structure.
Upon viewing an automaton’s actions, it may be possible to infer an utility
function via posterior rationality, but this will not be critical in the current
project. In addition, it will not be necessary to assume that the automata
have perfect information about the game. In the real world, it is more common
than not that players do not have perfect information upon which to base their
decisions [30]. Therefore, if an automaton is to represent a “real” strategy set,
it would be useful to equip them with a decision-making structure which allows
them to function in the more likely environment.
Although this project will not consider these typical assumptions, it will
employ the assumption of a certain “sensibility”, that is, the automata will
prefer to receive more of a payoff than less. In addition, although they do not
have access to complete information, they will make use of whatever information
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they have to guide their decisions towards a higher payoff. The intent of this
framework is to consider a wide range of strategies that are “sensible”, though
not necessarily rational, and to find from among them some aspects of strategy
which would lead to “sensible” decision-making in a world of similarly “sensible”
agents.
3.2 A New Bargaining Game
The following section will describe the process of creating a new bargaining
model built on the structure of Rubinstein’s bargaining game. The intent of
this modelling approach is to capture a close approximation to real-world bar-
gaining behaviour and to analyze it within a similar framework of classical game
theory. Analysis of this model will follow the precedents of similar such mod-
elling approaches, like Axelrod’s analysis of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game.
The general outline of this model will be as follows. Two players will be
paired to bargain over a fixed amount of surplus utility. The players will then be
able to make offers over the allocation of this utility that can be accepted by the
other player. One player will be chosen at random to make the first offer, after
which the players will make alternating offers until an offer is accepted at which
point each player is allocated their agreed upon portion of the utility. Both
players will be impatient, meaning that the value of the surplus will diminish
over time.
Effectively, this will be a positive-sum strategic form game with imperfect
information. At each decision node, the players will be uncertain about how
their opponent would respond further down any given branch of the game tree.
Consequently, players will need to infer behaviour patterns from their opponent
to deduce what their future reactions could be before making a decision. As
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such, this model will allow different forms of strategic inference to be assessed
when players have limited access to computational power.
3.2.1 Defining the Game
The following is a formal definition of the bargaining game used in this model.
Hereafter, this will be referred to as “the bargaining game”.
Two players are paired to bargain over a pie of surplus and transferable
utility of size 1. Once players have agreed upon an allocation of the pie, they
will receive their agreed upon portion. All agreements will be in the form (x1, x2)
where xi is Player i’s share of the pie. These agreements belong to the set of all
possible agreements (x1, xx) ∈ X and must satisfy
(x1, x2) ∈ R2
x1 + x2 = 1 (3.1)
xi ≥ 0 for i=1,2
Note that xi only refers to the size of Player i ’s allotted pie and not his utility
for that portion of pie. Players are concerned with maximizing their share of
the pie, and therefore their utility, at the expense of their opponent receiving a
smaller share. For any x, y ∈ X where X is the set of all possible portions of
a pie of size 1, a player will prefer x to y if and only if x > y, meaning that a
player will always prefer to receive a larger share of pie.
Each offer in the game will take place at a particular point t ∈ T in the
infinite set of time T = {0, 1, 2, ...}. At time t = 0, one player will be selected as
Player 1. At this time, Player 1 will propose an offer to Player 2. Player 2 then
either chooses to accept Player 1’s offer and receive the agreed upon portion of
pie, or else reject the offer. Should Player 2 reject the offer, time will advance
to t = 1 at which point Player 2 will make an offer to Player 1. This process
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will continue until an agreement is reached. There is no limit to the number of
offers that can be made, nor is their a limit to the content of the offers other
than the constraints listed in (3.1).
Each player will have a preference for time, denoted by a discount factor
δ. This discount factor will create the perception of a shrinking pie, where
each player has less utility for a particular portion of pie the longer it takes to
acquire it. If x and y are both portions of pie that a player can offer or be
offered, for any x, y ∈ X and t ∈ T , a player prefers (x, t)  (x, t+ 1), as well as
(x, t)  (y, t) when x > y. At any time t ∈ T in the game, Player 1 may make
an offer x ∈ [0, 1] to Player 2. Player 2 must decide whether to accept the offer,
or return a counteroffer y ∈ [0, 1] to player 1, effectively comparing (1 − x) to
y × δ. The sensible player accepts the offer when (1− x) > y × δ and rejects it
when y × δ > (1− x).
At any given decision node, a player only knows their own discount factor,
and all of the previous offers made in the game. Since the players do not
have information regarding their opponent’s preferences, their decisions will
not necessarily mimic equilibrium behaviour as they will not always be able to
correctly infer their opponent’s future moves. In addition, the bargainers will
not be assumed to be perfectly rational agents, as the decision-making processes
will be entirely governed by the structure of the automata, and thus subject to
a bounded rationality, meaning that they possess limited cognitive processing
capabilities. Also note that the game tree contains unbounded branches that
are an infinite sequence of rejected offers. These branches can be understood as
a disagreement, where both players do not receive any of the pie.
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3.2.2 Assumptions
This model will be built on the presupposition that neither player will know
how their opponent values time, therebye forcing them to rely upon inferences of
their opponent’s position based on the offers that they receive. These inferences
will be made in different fashions within each class of automata. A similar
model was reviewed by Cramton [10], but his analysis focused on the passage of
time between offers as the primary means of communicating information about
the players’ position, rather than a sequence of revealing offers. This model will
instead focus on a sequence of alternating offers at consecutive discrete instances
in time.
In addition, the following formal assumptions will be imposed in this model.
Recall from earlier [22] that these assumptions are used in the classical Rubin-
stein alternating-offers bargaining model.
(A-1) Pie is desirable For any t ∈ T and x, y ∈ X, we have (x, t)  (y, t) if and
only if x > y
(A-2) Time is valuable For any t, s ∈ T and x ∈ X with s > t, we have
(x, t)  (x, s) if x > 0
(A-3) Continuity Player preferences are continuous
(A-4) Stationarity If (x, t1)  (y, t1 + 1), then (x, t2)  (y, t2 + 1), meaning that
the preference of (x, t) over (y, t+ 1) is independent of t.
For the sake of the analysis in this project we will invoke another assumption
to confine the actions of the players. Although a principal finding from the
classical analysis of the Rubinstein model was that the bargaining outcomes are
governed by the relative impatience between the players, this model can not
provide the same result as the players are not aware of their opponent’s level of
impatience. Since the conventional analysis of the sub-game perfect equilibrium
can not be performed in this case of incomplete knowledge, the ensuing outcomes
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can not be calculated in the same manner. To constrain the possible outcomes
for analysis, it will be assumed that both players are equally impatient, but are
not aware of this fact.
(A-5) Unknown similarity of time preference Both players have equal urgency to
reach agreement, but they are unaware of their opponent’s preferences.
3.3 Round-Robin Bargaining Tournament
Now that the underlying game has been defined, we must create a framework
through which to evaluate the playing of the game. Since we have rejected
the assumption of complete information, this model allows for a wide range
of possible outcomes that can not be analyzed with the traditional method.
Therefore, a new method of analysis must be adopted that can shed some light
onto the new-found complexity of the bargaining game.
Since the players in this bargaining game do not have access to complete
information, they can not make completely rational decisions and therefore,
there is no clear cut solution to the game. Fortunately, there are ways to
approximate rational behaviour in complex interactions, even when a perfect
solution does not exist.
Enter the agent-based modelling approach. As previously discussed, Robert
Axelrod [3] ran his famous Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments to sift
through possible strategies to the iterated game in pursuit of the best possible
strategy. Clearly in the case of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, there does
not exist a perfect strategy that will dominate every other possible strategy, but
that does not mean that it is impossible to discover very good strategies and their
underpinning principles. Tit-For-Tat proved to be a very robust strategy that
could succeed against a variety of opponents, but more importantly, it helped
highlight a number of key characteristics that would make a strategy successful.
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By simulating an agent-based model with a complex game, important intuitions
can be discerned from the results.
The present study will adopt a similar methodology to Axelrod, but in the
context of the bargaining game previously outlined. The first step in this process
is to create a tournament format within which a number of independent and
uniquely programmed agents can play each other in the bargaining game. The
agents will be represented by finite automata, embodying a range of strategies.
The tournament will be a round-robin format, where each automaton plays the
bargaining game against every other automaton, including a copy of itself. In
each such match-up, an automaton’s outcome will be calculated as the average
amount of discounted pie it receives while playing as Player 1 and as Player 2.
The score for each agent will constitute its average outcome across all of the
games it played in the tournament. Agents will then be ranked according to their
score, with the best performers ranked highest and the worst performers ranked
lowest. This ranking will allow for a preliminary analysis of the robustness and
performance of different strategies.
3.3.1 The Automata
The purpose of using automata in this analysis is that they afford to us a
distinct structure with an understandable and bounded range of possible actions.
The set of automata to be used in the tournament will represent a range of
bargaining strategies, ranging both in complexity and in intent. These strategies
will take root from a number of different fields. Some of these strategies will be
representations of simple rules-of-thumb which are commonly espoused in real-
world bargaining situations with incomplete information [11], while some others
may have integrated a number of such simple approaches into a unique strategy.
Finally, a set of strategies will be implemented that seek to model empirically
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observed human bargaining behaviour. This set of strategies will be inherently
more complex than their counterparts, but will still rely on a few fundamental
bargaining heuristics. As previously discussed, these heuristics are effectively
just simple decision-making structures which can be employed in an attempt
to solve a complex problem that would otherwise be computationally expensive
or even impossible. Relying on experimental results in a number of studies on
bargaining, these heuristics will be integrated so as to attempt to form a crude
model of the human “bargaining mind”. Although any finite automaton will
almost surely represent an oversimplification of such a complex structure, the
intent of this modelling approach is to create a framework to understand in a
general sense how one might better approach a bargaining situation in the real
world.
For the sake of analysis, the automata can be seen as “black boxes”, with
bounded rationality and an unalterable structure. Therefore, we must consider
a meta-game based on the selection of automata to play the bargaining game
on one’s behalf. Automaton selection games have been extensively analyzed in
the context of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game [1, 7], but also within the
framework of Rubinstein’s bargaining game by Binmore et al. [6]. Typically,
automaton selection games are primarily concerned with maximizing expected
payoff, with secondary goals including minimizing complexity, or achieving evo-
lutionary stability. In the present study, meta-players will be chiefly concerned
with selecting an automaton that maximizes their expected payoff in the bar-
gaining game, but considerations will be briefly discussed for complexity and
evolutionary stability. The purpose of the meta-game is to provide a framework
through which to optimize strategy selection within the bargaining game, and
thereby understand strategy optimization within a bargaining context.
The following sections will describe the structures of the automata to be
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considered in this report. See Appendix B.1 for the Matlab code governing the
automata and their decision-making process.
Structure
The automata to be considered in this report will vary in complexity, but consist
of an identical underlying structure. Each automaton will begin the bargaining
game in an initial state. Once the game starts, it will receive inputs (offers from
the opponent) which will cause the automaton to change to a different state.
Each state will correspond to a particular method for processing an output.
Figure 3.1 shows a visual representation of this operation.
The precise definition of these automaton is as follows. The automaton will
receive inputs and produce outputs representing a demand for a share of the pie
x ∈ [0, 1]. An automaton
A =< S, sY , ζ, f > consists of four components [6].
• A set of states S = {s0, s1, ...}, including the initial state, s0, which can
be understood as an initial offer, an entitlement, or level of aspiration.
• An acceptance state sY wherein the automaton accepts his opponent’s
offer and signals the end of the bargaining game. sY → Y
• An output function ζ corresponding to each of the states. The output
of an automaton x ∈ [0, 1] refers to the outgoing offer, the automaton’s
demand for his share of the pie. The output function may refer to the
received input while producing its output. {S × [0, 1]} → [0, 1]
• A transition function f which changes the state of the automaton accord-
ing to the received input. {S × [0, 1]} → S
Essentially, each state has a fixed process for translating an input into an
output, while a transition function has fixed conditions which govern when an
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Figure 3.1: Simple Automaton Diagram: The automaton will receive an input
then produce an output in accordance with its set of states and transition func-
tions. In this context, the input will consist of: an offer of pie, the current
time period, and the history of past offer. The output will either be a signal of
acceptance or a counter-offer.
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automaton will change states. If an input is received that fulfills the transition
conditions, the automaton will shift to the corresponding new state, and that
state will process the input and produce an output. In the context of the
bargaining game, an input would be an offer received from an opponent, while
an output would either be a counter-offer or a signal of acceptance. The states,
transition conditions, and methods of processing inputs will be unique for each
of the automata explored here.
Features
A set of 47 unique automata were designed for this project, with each represent-
ing a different strategic approach to the bargaining game. These strategies were
designed to either mimic empirically observed bargaining behaviour in experi-
ments with similar situations to the bargaining game, or to represent common
rules-of-thumb for how to approach bargaining. The structure of their decision
making process can be found in Appendix B.1 and the naming system can be
found in Appendix A.1.
A key feature in each of the automata is their level of initial offer. Variance in
initial offer size has been shown to stem from misperceptions of available utility,
individual level of aspiration, or tactical chest-puffing to signal a strong position
to the opponent [24, 19, 5, 16]. As such, automata from each major class were
programmed to begin the bargaining game with an initial offer at either a High
(60% of the pie), Medium (55% of the pie), or Low (50% of the pie) level2. This
allowed the questions of how initial offer sizes would affect particular strategies
and how they would affect strategy in general to be explored.
Seven distinct major classes of automata were programmed to represent par-
ticular strategic approaches. Some classes were more complex and allowed their
2These initial offer sizes were selected as they produced significant variability within the
results, while maintaining a limited scope of the project. In the future, a wider range of offers
could be tested using a genetic algorithm (see Chapter 5).
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corresponding bargaining agents to recognize bargaining patterns and respond
to them in a specific manner. Other classes were more simple and used less
information to guide their play in the bargaining game. The seven classes of
automaton are the Hawk/Dove class, the Reasonableness class, the Tit-For-
Tat class, the Prospect Theory class, the Mean class, the Yield class, and the
Split-the-Difference class.
The Hawk/Dove class of automata were designed to interpret bargaining be-
haviour as if it were playing the Hawk/Dove game. Therefore, an automaton in
this class would consider their opponent’s offer size and concession patterns and
decide whether the opponent was playing as a Hawk or a Dove, and then make a
rational response in the bargaining game. For example, if an opponent were to
make minimal concessions and thus show little regard for the time-discounting
of the surplus utility, an automaton of this class would respond with larger
concessions to reach an agreement faster. The third and fourth component of
an automaton’s name3 from this class designates its default concession pattern,
while the Hawk/Dove aspect will scale their concession size accordingly. This
default concession pattern can be understood as what the automaton of this
class deems to be fair bargaining behaviour. Therefore, if an opponent makes
concessions larger than what a Hawk/Dove automaton would deem to be fair,
the Hawk/Dove automaton determines that the opponent is a Dove, and will
consequently make a smaller concession. Similarly, should the opponent make
a concession smaller than what the Hawk/Dove automaton would make should
the roles be reversed, the Hawk/Dove automaton would respond with a larger
concession.
The Reasonableness class of automata was designed to represent empiri-
cally observed pattern recognition and response behaviour in bargaining. An
automaton of this class would consider factors such as the opponent’s initial
3See Appendix A.1.
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offer size and concession size to infer their opponent’s “reasonableness”. If an
opponent were deemed to be reasonable, an automaton from this class would
make initially large concessions, but decrease the size of its concessions in an
attempt to secure a greater allotment of the surplus if the opponent continued
to make concessions in turn. If the opponent were deemed unreasonable, an
automaton from this class would decrease its concession size until the opponent
would change its behaviour. Similar to the Hawk/Dove class, the third and
fourth components of the names of automata from this class dictate a base-rate
concession pattern which is then scaled by interpretation of the opponent’s rea-
sonableness. Again, this base-rate for concession making can be understood as
the automaton’s perception of what fair bargaining might look like, and their
impression of their opponent is made relative to this sense of fairness.
The underlying concession patterns used by the Hawk/Dove and Reason-
ableness automata will call for either Increasing concession size, or Decreasing
concession size. In addition, the change in concession size will either be Linear
or Exponential, in which case the change of concession size between each offer
is initially large, then slows down, similar to an exponential decay process. The
justification for the pattern-recognition behaviour of this class can be found in
Section 2.2.
The Tit-For-Tat class of automata was designed to translate the famous
strategy from the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game to the bargaining game. In
this case, this class does not attempt to recognize patterns, but merely mirrors
its opponent’s concessions until an agreement is reached.
The Prospect Theory class of automata was designed to represent the risk be-
haviour of agents facing uncertainty proposed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky[15, 29]. The central idea to this design is that the agent has a pre-
conceived notion, or frame, of what their fair share of the surplus should be.
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Automata from this class will each have a distinct “frame” value, either High,
Medium, or Low. Following the behaviour predicted by the Prospect Theory, the
agent would respond to unfavourable offers with more risk-seeking behaviour,
while responding to favourable offers with risk-averse behaviour. In the context
of the bargaining game, risk-seeking behaviour would be represented by minimal
concession making in an effort to force the hand of the opponent to accept a
smaller allocation of the surplus, while risk-averse behaviour would be seen as
making more lenient concessions in an effort to reach agreement faster. Further
discussion on this type of reasoning can be found in Section 2.5. This strategy
involves considering the amount of discounted pie that it could receive in each
round, and comparing this value to its “frame”. Given the relationship between
this value of discounted pie and the frame, it will decide upon the appropriate
concession size.
The Mean class of automata is analogous to the “Always Defect” strategy
in Axelrod’s [3] Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments. In this case, the Mean class
will make an initial offer and refuse to make any concession, only repeating its
same initial offer.
The Yield class of automata is effectively antithetic to the Mean class. The
Yield class will accept any offer immediately, preventing any loss from the time-
discounting of the surplus, while the Mean class will refuse to make any conces-
sion from their initial offer. These two tactics work as benchmarks and ensure
the robustness of the other strategies.
The Split-the-Difference class of automata was designed to represent the
commonly espoused approach to meet-in-the-middle in a negotiation setting.
An automaton from this class will concede half of the discrepancy between his
and his opponent’s previous offers.
The single automaton in the SPE class represents the sub-game perfect equi-
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librium strategy, where the automaton will figure out whether it is Player 1 or
Player 2, and make a demand in accordance with the classic sub-game perfect
equilibrium method of solving the Rubinstein bargaining game. If an agreement
is not immediately reached, the automaton will insist on the same division of the
pie until the opponent accepts the proposal. In addition, this strategy will only
accept offers where they will receive at least the proportion of utility dictated
by the sub-game perfect equilibrium solution. This strategy represents the ideal
play of the bargaining game and can thus be used as a barometer with which to
measure the performance of other strategies. If a bargainer were to employ the
SPE strategy against an opponent using the same strategy, they would attain
the optimal result.
The following is an example of a bargaining interaction between two of the
automata to further demonstrate their structure and operation. The first table
shows the bargaining game being played by H-Rea-D-E4 as Player 1 and M-50
as Player 2. The second table shows M-50 playing as Player 1 and H-Rea-D-E
playing as Player 2. In this instance, the discount factor will be δ = 0.95.
In both of the following tables, the numbers in each box represent an of-
fer made by the corresponding automaton. The offers are the non-discounted
portion of the pie that they are demanding from their opponent. When an au-
tomaton decides to accept its opponent’s previous offer, it will respond with a
Y acceptance of the offer.
H-Rea-D-E 0.60 Y
M-50 0.55
M-50 0.55 0.475
H-Rea-D-E 0.60 Y
In this match-up, when H-Rea-D-E is Player 1, he will finish with a dis-
4The naming system for the automata can be found in Appendix A.1.
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counted payoff of 0.42755, while M-50 receives 0.5225. When M-50 is Player
1, she will receive 0.4287, while H-Rea-D-E receives 0.4738. Therefore, the ex-
pected payoff for H-Rea-D-E in this match-up is 0.4507, while the expected
payoff for M-50 is 0.4756, as each player has an equal chance of making the first
offer.
The pseudo-code for these automata is as follows:
H-Rea-D-E
• If first offer, make offer of size 0.60. Else decide concession size.
– Concede a portion of the difference between my last offer and the
current offer (This portion decreases exponentially as time passes).
– If opponent made a larger initial offer than me, decrease my conces-
sion size.
– If the relative size of the opponent’s concessions is decreasing, in-
crease my concession size.
• If opponent’s offer is larger than my previous offer less my current conces-
sion, discounted by one time period, accept the offer (Y ). Else send offer
of previous offer less my current concession.
M-50
• If first offer, make offer of size 0.55. Else decide concession size.
– Concede one half of the difference between my last offer and the
current offer.
• If opponent’s offer is larger than my previous offer less my current conces-
sion, discounted by one time period, accept the offer (Y ). Else send offer
of previous offer less my current concession.
5The discounted payoffs are the portion [0,1] of the original pie that a player receives.
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Figure 3.2: H-Y vs Lo-Mean
The following are representative bargaining games played by a number of
different automata to demonstrate how they would play a bargaining game and
to highlight some of the different behaviours between the different classes of
automata. These games are all played with a discount factor of δ = 0.95. The
numbers in each box represent that player’s demanded portion of the pie in that
round, and the numbers at the bottom of the tables track how much time has
passed in the game, and therefore the level of discounting that will be applied to
the final agreement. The discounted amount of pie that each player will receive
is noted in parentheses in the last column of each table. Note that in the case
of SPE vs SPE, the outcome will be the same, regardless of which copy of this
automaton is Player 1. The SPE strategy recognizes whether it is Player 1 or
Player 2, and makes the corresponding sub-game-perfect equilibrium offer.
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Figure 3.3: SPE vs SPE
Figure 3.4: SPE vs H-Mean
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Figure 3.5: Lo-T4T vs H-Pro-H
3.3.2 Preliminary Tournament Results
The initial round-robin tournament was run at three different levels of the dis-
count factor, namely 0.93, 0.95, and 0.97 6. This was done so as to explore the
robustness of the strategies and to observe whether there would be significant
changes in their performance given different conditions. A table showing the
results of the different runs of this tournament can be found in Appendix A.2.
Before discussing the results, it is first important to note that only limited
conclusions should be drawn from this tournament. First and foremost, it must
be noted that the outcomes generated by the automata are directly related to
the mechanics of their opponents’ strategies, which are quite limited. There-
fore, caution must be employed before making any inference about the absolute
usefulness of a strategy, as this approach only demonstrates their relative value
within this artificial model framework. Second, although the round-robin ap-
6At discount factors below 0.93, there is no relative change from the results of the simula-
tions using a discount factor of 0.93, and therefore these cases have been omitted.
54 CHAPTER 3. AN ADAPTATION OF THE RUBINSTEIN MODEL
proach is useful for broadly stratifying the results of a diverse group of strategies,
it is important to consider that each match-up in the tournament is given equal
weight in the final ranking of performances. Therefore, an agent who can suc-
cessfully take advantage of a particular large class may benefit from inflated
scores against that class while performing poorly against the other classes, but
still scoring well on average.
The results of the tournament provide a few points of interest concerning
strategy selection in the bargaining game. First, it is interesting to note that
the worst performers were generally the most successful at securing a larger
proportion of the pie, but at a very high cost of time, and thus leading to a
very poor final score7. On the other hand, the very best performers typically
secured close to or less than half of the pie on average, what would be consid-
ered close to the fair division8, and with minimal delay9. Second, although the
very top performers typically began the game with a large initial demand of
the pie, on average, those with Low initial offers out-performed their counter-
parts10. Automata making High initial demands showed the greatest variability
in performance, representing the very top performers and the very worst. Fi-
nally, there was a distinct correlation between successful automata and their
ability to reach agreement quickly11. This may seem obvious given the time-
discounting factor, but there does not appear to be a direct trade-off between
achieving a fair allocation of the pie and reaching agreement quickly as a few of
the automata were able to manage both of these successfully.
7Strategies obtaining on average greater than 50% of the pie scored less than average with
significance p < 0.001
8Strategies ranking in the top third obtained less than 50.5% of the pie with significance
p < 0.001
9Strategies ranking in the top third reached agreement faster than average with significance
p < 0.001
10Low initial offer strategies placed better than their counterparts using a Medium or High
initial offer size with significance p < 0.001
11Correlation between average number of turns and final ranking was 0.891, using the
Initial Round-Robin Rankings in Appendix A.2 and the corresponding Average Turns for
each strategy.
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3.3.3 Thinning the Herd
To narrow the focus onto effective strategies, strategies which proved to be
ineffectual, or otherwise replaceable were removed from consideration. The first
method employed in the effort to eliminate strategies and reduce the scope of
analysis was to look for strict dominance among the set of all automata. Due to
the complex nature of the interactions in the bargaining game, strict domination
was very rare, with only three strategies eliminated via this method. Since the
common technique of solving a game via the elimination of dominated strategies
did not prove fruitful, the subsequent approach involved searching for significant
dominance in the average outcomes, rather than the set of individual match-
up outcomes. For example, in the Prospect class, the automata with a High
initial offer performed significantly worse on average than their counterparts
with smaller initial offer sizes12 and were thus eliminated from further study in
the round-robin tournament.
These strategies were eliminated with the intent of running the round-robin
tournament again, but with a smaller group of automata. This elimination
process was useful to shift the focus onto the performance of strategies against
other strategies that may actually be employed by an opponent, rather than
considering how they would fare against strategies that were almost certainly
deficient in some manner.
3.3.4 Tournament Re-Run
The round-robin tournament was run again using the smaller set of automata
which had survived the elimination process. The outcomes of this tournament
can found in Appendix A.3, again at the discount factors of 0.93, 0.95, and 0.97.
Twenty-six Automata were involved in this tournament, representing the same
12As can be seen in Appendix A.2, these automata finish at the bottom of the rankings in
the Initial Round-Robin Tournaments.
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set of strategic classes that were present in the first tournament.
The most noticeable aspect of the results of this second tournament is the
decrease in the difference between the scores of the top finishers and the bot-
tom finishers. Although the top performers from the first round did not fare
significantly better in this tournament, the mean outcome increased13 as there
were fewer extremely poor performers. This observation follows the conclusions
in the paper by Binmore et al. [6] on evolutionary stability in the Rubin-
stein bargaining game which suggested that when exposed to selective pressure,
strategies would converge towards the sub-game perfect equilibrium in the Ru-
binstein model. Although the process of strategy elimination used here does not
necessarily mirror the selective pressures implied by this work, it does follow the
principle of eliminating agents based on some measure of fitness.
Another point of note in the results of the second run of the tournament
is the correlation between a high average allocation of the pie (greater than
50% of the pie) and poor overall performance14, similar to what was seen in
the first run, further suggesting the critical importance of reaching agreement
quickly. The second run of the tournament consisted of automata who had
previously been able to, on average, reach agreement in the bargaining game
faster than their counterparts, as seen in the results in Appendix A.3, where
there are fewer strategies averaging greater than 6 turns per game. Even in this
more “cooperative” setting, the strategies who were more demanding still were
not able to overcome the costliness of extended bargaining in an attempt to
secure a greater proportion of the pie. At the other end of the spectrum, there
was more strategic diversity among the top performers. Some strategies were
successful by reaching agreement very quickly (average game lasted less than 2
turns) at the cost of a smaller proportion of pie, for example, the Yield class,
13Thinned Round-Robin Tournaments had a higher average score than Initial Round-Robin
Tournaments with significance p < 0.001
14Correlation between a strategy’s Average Allocation of pie and final ranking was 0.696.
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while others were able to secure a more even division after only a small delay,
such as the Reasonableness class.
3.4 Tournament Discussion
The round-robin tournament provided a broad look at the interaction of a broad
range of bargaining strategies and began to shed light on some of the relatively
better strategies. Although this style of analysis proved fruitful in the Axelrod
[3] iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament, the additional degrees of freedom
present in the bargaining game increase the noisiness of the analysis and can
thus only induce general conclusions about the results. Fortunately, a num-
ber of noticeable trends became apparent in the running of the round-robin
tournaments for the bargaining game.
Obviously, success in the bargaining game relies upon one’s ability to se-
cure a large portion of the pie in a short amount of time. The automata used
to represent strategies in this tournament were diverse in approach, necessi-
tating proficient and robust bargaining tactics to generate a best-response to
each individual strategy. Interestingly, one automaton in particular was able
to achieve the best performance in tournaments using each of the discounting
factors explored. This strategy, H-Rea-D-E, was able to secure a large portion
of the pie against more forgiving opponents, while being able to quickly identify
and reach an agreement with delaying opponents before the payoff had decayed
substantially15. The pattern recognition heuristics employed by this automaton
were based on empirically observed bargaining behaviours in humans, and their
success suggests that more effort to understand them may prove useful.
A brief glance at the table of results of the round-robin tournaments in
15As can be seen in the table of results in Appendices A.2 and A.3, this strategy averages
very close to half of the allocation of the pie while requiring a relatively low average number
of turns to do so.
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Appendices A.2 and A.3 will show that the strategies who were excessively de-
manding in their bargaining performed quite poorly overall. Nearly all of the
automata who on average obtained greater than one half of the pie ended up
in the bottom half of the standings due to the excessive time delays required to
obtain their larger portion. Ironically, by trying to obtain more of the pie, these
automata ended up with a worse outcome. Interestingly, this result runs some-
what parallel to the principle espoused by Axelrod [3] at the conclusion of the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament, “Don’t be envious”. In the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, being envious meant defecting in an attempt to achieve a better
outcome, which is similar to creating delays in the bargaining game to achieve
a greater relative portion of the pie. This idea is further corroborated by the
results of the bargaining tournaments, as the Yield class of automata performed
quite well on average, simply by accepting any offer to avoid the erosive forces
of time. Clearly this strategy is exploitable as it is prone to accepting unfair
offers, but it helps illustrate the general principle of the need for fairness.
An intentional design feature of the round-robin tournament was the usage
of the SPE automaton as a barometer to evaluate the value of the other strate-
gies. Since the SPE strategy represents the optimal solution to the bargaining
game, its relative success in a round-robin tournament will show how close the
other strategies are to the optimal solution. The better this automaton were to
perform, the better the other strategies must be. The lack of success for this
strategy in these round-robin tournaments could suggest the more demanding
strategies are ineffective as their narrow focus on proportion of the pie spoils
the final outcome against reasonable bargainers. This idea about the SPE au-
tomaton as a barometer will be explored in further detail later on.
It is important to note the the effect of the strategies who take many rounds
to reach agreement. As mentioned earlier, the Thinned Round-Robin tourna-
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ment saw a better average score for its participants than the Initial Round-Robin
tournament, as a number of the poorer performers were removed from con-
tention. Typically, these poor performers performed poorly due to the length of
time that it took them to reach agreement. In their attempts to secure a higher
proportion of the pie, they actually decreased the final discounted amount of
pie they would receive, leading to worse outcomes. Since this behaviour leads
to a bad performance for both the individual bargainer using this strategy and
for his opponent, it would be best to avoid selecting such strategies in practice.
The tendency to unnecessarily prolong the negotiations is therefore irrational, it
would be practical to consider the potential downside of selecting a bargaining
strategy that may lead to delays.
A final point of note about the results of the round-robin tournament is that
most of the successful automata were very accurate in their estimations of what
a “fair share” of the pie would look like, as they were allocated close to half of
the available pie on average. A critical challenge in real-world bargaining is the
ability to identify whether or not a surplus exists in a bargaining scenario, how
much exists and if a particular party has a specific entitlement to the surplus.
Although not accounted for in this model, the ability to accurately assess the
size of any surplus is critical to bargaining success. Therefore, any conclusions
or intuitions developed from this model must account for this blind-spot.
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Chapter 4
An Evolutionary Look at
Bargaining Strategy
This section will discuss using an alternative approach to optimizing strategy
selection in the bargaining game. A general model for this approach will be
proposed and simulations will be run to verify its usefulness. Finally, results of
the simulations will be discussed along with any possible conclusions that can
be extracted from them.
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To begin to understand the dynamics of strategy selection in the real world,
we must lean on the tools of evolutionary biology to adopt a proper context with
which to analyze this choice. Binmore et al. [6] showed how this approach could
be used specifically in the Rubinstein bargaining game, while many others have
used similar methods in the analysis of the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game
[9, 21]. While these approaches relied upon some form of bounded rationality,
the measures used thus far have further bounded the rationality of the agents
employed in the model, as these agents are confined to the use of heuristics or
decision frameworks which have been observed in human nature, as discussed
in Chapter 2. The intent now is to discover how these heuristic-based strategies
will adapt to selective pressure.
According to James March [17], given a stable world and stable preferences,
an adaptive-agent model will, over time, promote the emergence of approxi-
mately rational behaviour from its constituents. Therefore, any change in be-
haviour in an agent-based model will likely be an adaptive response given the
current environment. However, caution must be used in analysis of this model,
as adaptations may be drawn towards local optima which may be dissimilar
from the absolute optimum. For example, the automobile is a superior form
of human transportation than the use of horse-drawn carriages, but selective
pressures would likely never be able to create adaptations in horses which make
them resemble an automobile. This is just to say that the nature of selective
pressures and the available modes of adaptation can significantly restrict the set
of possible results, and therefore conclusions from such approaches should not
he treated as absolute truths.
The following section will explore an ecological approach to determining
dominance across a broad range of strategies. The ecological approach is simi-
lar to an evolutionary model, but does not allow agents to undergo adaptations,
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but merely evaluates them on a measure of fitness and maps those evaluations to
a global population structure. This modelling approach will provide a more real-
istic context for the bargaining game and the corresponding bargaining strategy
selection meta-game.
4.1 An Ecological Modelling Approach
The ecological modelling approach used in this project is an agent-based mod-
elling approach where the agents to be studied are represented by the previ-
ously discussed automata which play the bargaining game. In this model, each
of the strategies represented by the automata discussed in the second round
of the round-robin tournament will be represented by an equal initial “popula-
tion size” in an ecosystem. This ecosystem will be simulated for a number of
generations, wherein each generation, the agents will play the bargaining game
against each of the other agents in the ecosystem. After each generation, the
total discounted amount of pie obtained by each of the agents will be referred to
as their individual fitness in that generation. Then, according to a population
change algorithm, each agent will reproduce itself into the next generation of
the simulation in proportion to its fitness level in that generation. In general, if
a particular type of agent has a high level of fitness in a particular generation,
it will be represented in greater numbers in the subsequent generation, while a
type of agent with a low fitness level will see its numbers decrease in the next
generation. This simulation process will continue until a population equilibrium
is reached. Along the way, it is expected that certain populations of agents will
die out altogether, while others expand into the ecosystem. Once an equilibrium
is reached, the overall dynamics of the simulation can be analyzed.
This approach follows that used by Axelrod [3] in his analysis of the it-
erated Prisoner’s Dilemma game tournament. This method proved to be an
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effective way of finding the best strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, since as the simulation wore on, a strategy would have to continue to per-
form well against similarly successful strategies to continue to appear in future
generations. In addition, this style of model can help represent the strategic
environment of a society, where individual agents are able to choose a strategy
which best suits them, and then these agents must employ successful strategies
to continue playing the game with other members of society. In this scenario,
the ecological model style is well-suited to represent societal dynamics in real-
life, as real world agents would likely stop using a strategy that is unsuccessful
and adopt a strategy that had been used successfully by others in the past. This
style of societal agent-based modelling has been used again by Axelrod [2] in
modelling societal norms and political preferences.
4.1.1 Population Change Algorithms
The driving force of population change in an ecological model is the relative
fitness of a “species” compared to the rest of the population. In the context
of this project, fitness is defined as the expected score in the bargaining game
against the rest of the current populations in the ecosystem at the current time.
Each “species” will be a strategy represented by one of the automata discussed
in Chapter 3. Two methods of driving population dynamics will be discussed
here.
The following equation represents the proportional change in population
size for each sub-population using a particular strategy. The sole driver of
the population dynamics in this ecological simulation is the comparison of a
strategy’s fitness in a particular time period, Dj , compared to the population’s
average fitness in the same time period, D¯. If the overall population size is
assumed to be constant, the size of the next generation of a sub-population
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using a particular strategy, j, is represented by
P i+1j = P
i
j + ∆
(
Dj
D¯
− 1
)
P ij (4.1)
where ∆ is a fraction that scales the rate of change of the population structure,
and P ij represents the current size of the sub-population using strategy j. This
approach is referred to as fitness proportionate selection and is used in genetic
algorithms concerned with selecting useful solutions [3, 8].
The second approach to population change dynamics used in this project is as
follows. At any given generation, the fitness of each individual sub-population
will be compared to the mean fitness of the whole population at that time.
If a species’ fitness is greater than one standard deviation above the mean,
that species will increase in size by one member in the subsequent generation,
whereas if a species has a fitness level less than one standard deviation below
the mean, it will lose one member in the next generation. If a species’ fitness
level is within one standard deviation of the mean, its size will remain the same
in the next generation. Going forward, this dynamic will be referred to as the
standard deviation algorithm. This approach provides a lower resolution look at
the population dynamics of an ecosystem, but is useful for quickly stratifying
the performance of the different strategies in consideration.
4.1.2 Narrowing the Field
Building from the results of the round-robin tournament approach discussed in
Chapter 3, the automata who were present in the second round of the tour-
nament will now be considered in an ecological tournament. These surviving
strategies will now be represented by agents in an ecosystem and subjected
to selective pressures to further analyze their performance in a more detailed
context.
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Before beginning the simulation of this new ecological tournament, it is im-
portant to consider the fact that ecological models can be prone to positive
feedback loops. The purpose of this modelling approach is to select a dominant
bargaining strategy that out-performs similarly competent strategies. To effec-
tively do so, the strategies to be selected from must be compared on somewhat
equal footing to ensure that the best option is chosen. Therefore, a method of
control must be instilled in the simulation process to ensure a semblance of fair
competition.
To do so, the first step of the ecological tournament will be to drop all
surviving automata into an ecosystem simulation using the standard deviation
algorithm. The simulation will be run until an equilibrium is reached and the
surviving strategies will be noted. This can be seen in Appendix A.4 in Figures
A.1, A.2, and A.3 where the labeled are the survivors. Subsequently, these
surviving “species” will be placed into an ecological simulation using the delta
factor algorithm, each beginning with an equal initial population size. This
simulation will then be run until the system reaches an equilibrium and the best
strategies will be ranked according to their population size or by the amount
of time it took for their kind to die out. This process ensures not only that
the eventual winners were successful against other competent strategies, but
also that their success did not come from taking advantage of weaker strategies.
Essentially, by undergoing a more demanding selection process, the robustness
of the top performing strategies is ensured.
The following figures demonstrate this filtration process and show the dy-
namics of the ecological simulation. Figure 4.1 shows the surviving strategies
from Chapter 3 placed in a simulation using the standard deviation algorithm.
Figure 4.2 then shows the surviving strategies from the standard deviation sim-
ulation being re-established on equal footing in a simulation using the delta
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Figure 4.1: Standard Deviation Algorithm Simulation δ = 0.95: In this sim-
ulation, each strategy noted in the Thinned Round-Robin Tournament begins
with the same initial population size. Population change occurs in each gener-
ation according to the standard deviation algorithm until a final equilibrium is
reached. The surviving strategies at this equilibrium are those noted.
factor algorithm.
4.2 Ecological Tournament Results
Similar to the Round-Robin Tournament discussed in Chapter 3, the Ecological
Tournament was run using the methods described in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 three
separate times and using three different discount factors. The discount factors
used in this tournament were the same as those used in the Round-Robin Tour-
nament, namely 0.93, 0.95, and 0.97. Each tournament began with the same
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Figure 4.2: Filtered Ecological Simulation δ = 0.95: The surviving strategies
noted in Figure 4.1 begin this simulation with the same initial population size.
The simulation is run according to the proportional population change algo-
rithm until a final equilibrium is reached. The surviving strategies are ranked
according to their final population size.
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filtering process in which the Standard Deviation Algorithm was used to elimi-
nate weaker strategies, before beginning a new simulation with each “species”,
or strategy, beginning with the same initial population size. The simulations
were then run until a final equilibrium was reached and the performances of each
strategy were assessed from there. Complete results from these simulations can
be found in Appendix A.4, plus a figure showing the final rankings at the end of
this section. At any point in these simulations, strategies with larger population
sizes can be said to be performing better than those with smaller population
sizes. If multiple strategies are present at the final equilibrium in the simulation,
these strategies are ranked in superiority according to their population size. For
the strategies that die out through the course of a simulation, the strategies
that die out later in the simulation are ranked higher than those who died out
earlier.
In the simulation using a discount factor of 0.93, the top three finishers were
the SPE, H-Y, and M-Mean strategies. It is interesting to note that in this sim-
ulation where time was the most valuable, the tournament was dominated by
strategies which were designed to reach agreement as fast as possible with min-
imal regard for pattern recognition, putting on a facade of toughness, or other
tactics. The fact that the SPE strategy performed better in the ecological sim-
ulation (placing first) than in the round-robin style tournament (placing 20th)
could suggest that there is convergent pressure towards the optimal bargaining
solution given certain adaptive mechanisms. In addition, it is interesting to note
that SPE dominated both the initial filtering simulation and the final ecological
simulation after re-starting on equal footing in the latter. This is likely due to
the fact that SPE performs “perfectly” against itself and well enough against
other strategies, that in a time-demanding scenario, it will dominate a popula-
tion given a small foothold. Figures A.4, A.5, and A.6 in Appendix A.4 contain
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the final results of the ecological simulations.
In the simulation using a discount factor of 0.95, the top three finishers were
Lo-Mean, Lo-HD-I-L, and Lo-HD-D-L. This simulation saw a final equilibrium
with a large number of strategies still “alive” in the simulation, meaning that
there was not enough variance in their fitness to cause more to die out. The
key similarity between these surviving strategies was their Low initial offer size
which in general leads to an agreement being reached more quickly compared
to strategies demanding a larger initial offer1. It is interesting to note in this
simulation that the strategies who performed well in the initial filtering simula-
tion did not survive the final ecological simulation2. These strategies that died
out had higher initial demands, which would lead to longer bargaining games
and thus depreciate the value of the pie. It therefore seems that a group of
somewhat cooperative strategies may be able to fend off “tougher” strategies
through their own cooperation in a sense.
In the simulation using a discount factor of 0.97, the top three finishers were
Lo-Mean, Lo-HD-I-L, and Lo-Pro-M. The general dynamics of this simulation
were quite similar to those from the simulation using a discount factor of 0.95
and the final equilibrium involved a number of strategies using a small initial
offer, while the filtering simulation had its top performers using a medium initial
offer size. That being said, the strategies which performed the best in this
simulation were slightly different than the top performers form the previous.
In this simulation, the Prospect class of strategies performed relatively well in
comparison to the other strategies and also the other simulations using different
discount factors. This class of strategy was designed to imitate empirically
1Low initial offer strategies reached agreement on average faster (lower number of average
turns to reach agreement) than Medium or High initial offer strategies with significance p <
0.001
2M-Rea-D-E, M-50, and M-HD-D-E were the top three most represented strategies in the
filtering simulation, but did not survive through the final ecological simulation. This can be
seen in Appendix A.4, comparing Figure A.3 to Figure A.4.
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observed human behaviour in decisions involving risk, and its relative success
here may suggest that the heuristics that humans have adapted to simplify risky
decision-making may have some merit. In this simulation in general, strategies
involving more pattern recognition and other such tactics performed better than
the simpler strategies.
The following tables provide the final rankings from the ecological simula-
tions. Again, if the simulation reaches a final equilibrium, strategies are ranked
according to their population size at this equilibrium. If they do not reach an
equilibrium, they are ranked according to how long it took for their population
to die out.
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Figure 4.3: Ecological Simulation Results δ = 0.93
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Figure 4.4: Ecological Simulation Results δ = 0.95
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Figure 4.5: Ecological Simulation Results δ = 0.97
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4.3 Ecological Tournament Discussion
The process of using selective pressure to determine dominance within a set
of strategies leans on principles similar to that of the Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy, or ESS. Although there is no risk of a population being invaded by a
group of rival strategies not previously present in the ecosystem, the proportions
of the overall population will adapt according to the definition of fitness and
its dynamics defined in Chapter 1 on page 13. The ecological study does not
allow the strategies themselves to adapt to change, but rather has the entire
population change to maximize the overall fitness level. Although Boyd and
Lorberbaum [9] showed that no pure ESS exists in the simpler iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, Binmore et al. [6] in 1998 showed a modified ESS was attainable
in an alternating-offers bargaining game. Binmore’s definition of a modified ESS
predicts a population of adaptive automaton bargainers to converge towards a
fifty-fifty split of the surplus in the Rubinstein bargaining game as the players
become more patient. As the players become more patient in the simulations
with discount factors of 0.95 and 0.97, strategies using small initial demands
but assertive concession patterns were able to survive until the final equilibrium
while the other strategies died out3. This approach appeared to be collectively
stable in the simulations involving lighter time-penalties, as a number of different
strategies sharing these characteristics were able to sustain themselves in these
simulations, while not in others. This success shows a resemblance to Axelrod’s
principles from the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments, “Be nice” and
“Be provocable” [3]. In this case, “Be nice” correlates to making a smaller
initial demand so that both players in the bargaining game begin closer to their
eventual agreement, thus requiring less time to get there. Here, “Be provocable”
3As seen in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, strategies making Low initial were the top finishers. In
addition, strategy classes such as Yield, Tit-for-Tat, and Fifty-Fifty, who do not recognize
patterns in the play of their opponent, did not place amongst the top performers.
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relates to standing tough against bargainers making excessive demands.
As the players became less patient, as in the simulations using a discount
factor of 0.93, the SPE strategy dominated the population, as seen in Figure
A.2 in Appendix A.4. As the time discounting became more severe, the cost
of delaying a round to secure a higher proportion of the pie became too much
to justify the delay. Therefore, strategies who were able to reach agreements
immediately performed well in this scenario, such as SPE and H-Y, who placed
first and second in this ecological simulation, respectively. In this case where
time is very valuable in the bargaining, the advantage of making the first offer
becomes quite apparent since those strategies who could not reach immediate
agreement quickly died out, as discussed by Rubinstein in his sub-game perfect
equilibrium solution to the bargaining game [22].
Although there was a limited number of strategies explored within the world
of this model, a few key observations can be made about how certain strategies
performed. First of all, it pays to “Be Nice” and make an initial offer that
is close to the fair division of the pie, as seen by the success of the strategies
employing a Low initial offer size in these ecological simulations. Second, it
does not pay to be resolute in your stance, as strategies who did not make
concessions in their demands performed very poorly, especially when their were
selective pressures involved in the ecological simulations. Finally, when selecting
a bargaining strategy, it is important to recognize your own level of patience,
as different strategies will perform better in certain contexts. For example, if
a bargainer were to find himself in a situation where any delay would be quite
costly, it would be imperative to select a strategy designed to reach agreement
immediately, or as soon as possible. Although these observations were made
in an artificial and bounded world, intuition says that these principles could
translate to real-world bargaining scenarios.
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The ecological simulations used here were necessarily limited in the scope
of strategies explored, but nonetheless provided some insight and detail to pre-
vious analysis on similar games. It was interesting to note that even without
any adaptive mechanisms in the model, there did appear to be a convergence
towards a fair splitting of the pie in the ecological simulations with small dis-
count factors, as predicted by Binmore et al. Future work is needed to solidify
these observations. Additionally, the principles espoused by Axelrod for the
playing of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game seem relatively applicable to
the bargaining game explored through this project. Again, more extensive study
would be required to determine whether this is just a product of the artificial
models used in this project, or whether these ideas point toward a general truth
in non-cooperative games which incentivize cooperation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This section will revisit the initial motivations of the project, summarize the
approach used, and reiterate the key findings. In addition, possible avenues of
future investigation will be presented and considered.
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5.1 Summary of Work
The purpose of this project was to explore the dynamics of strategy and strat-
egy selection in bargaining and how these phenomena map to the real world.
A game was proposed to represent real-world bargaining scenarios and which
could be used to analyze potential strategies. A set of strategies was designed
to represent observed human behaviour in bargaining and simple generally ac-
cepted bargaining tactics, creating a diverse range of strategies to explore and
analyze.
The round-robin tournaments and ecological simulations were used as means
to evaluate the set of strategies where more traditional analytical methods could
not ascertain dominance. The strategies considered were designed to represent
different heuristics for forming decisions when complete information was not
available. It was found that strategies involving some form of pattern recognition
were relatively useful when the cost of delay was small, but were dominated by
the strategy capable of computing the presumed sub-game perfect equilibrium as
time delays became more costly. Further analysis will be required to understand
the extendability of these results, as success in the bargaining game is largely
dependent upon the play of possible opponents.
It is important to note that the strategies explored in this project were
completely deterministic, and not necessarily representative of the set of all
strategies that could be used in the real world. As such, rigorous statistical
tools could not be applied to analyze the results of the simulations in depth.
However, the work presented here provides a foundation for the approach and
methods of future research in this area.
Although the specific results of this project do not carry much weight as they
are the product of a very artificial model, a few general comments can be made
about bargaining strategy. First of all, as is trivially obvious, bargainers should
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select strategies which will lead to agreement quickly to avoid unnecessary losses
to time-delay. In addition, strategies which seek a fair agreement will be more
robust to a wide range of opposing strategies, and greediness will usually lead to
time delays. Consequently, it would be beneficial to recognize quickly whether
or not an opponent is seeking more than their fair-share or is quite patient, so
as to respond accordingly before time-delays erode the gains to be had from
the bargaining. Finally, the strategies explored in this project relied upon the
assumption that players would be able to accurately assess the amount of surplus
utility to be had from bargaining. For these principles to hold true, real-world
bargainers must have a certain aptitude for correctly determining the size of the
gains to be had from bargaining.
5.2 Future Work
This project created a new foundation from which to explore bargaining strat-
egy, but left a number of avenues of approach untouched or unexplored in depth.
Here will be discussed a number of possible ways to expand upon the model and
otherwise apply and validate it.
5.2.1 Extension of the Model
A noticeable shortcoming of this work is that the strategic scope of the agents
has been limited by the bounded imagination of the author. Luckily, Nature is
not similarly limited, as random mutation allows for the continued exploration
of all possible strategic alternatives. To piggy-back off of Nature’s ability to
propose diverse solutions to ever-changing and complex problems, a genetic
algorithm could be implemented into the strategy formulation process. Such an
approach was used by Riolo [21] to attempt to optimize strategy in an iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, building off of previous work by Holland [14, 13] in
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the area of adaptive agents in economic theory.
Given the increased complexity in a bargaining game over that of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, it is reasonable to expect that such an approach would yield
more intelligent results than have been established in this project. By institut-
ing selective pressures and random mutation as the primary forces of strategy
optimization, a much wider net could be cast to capture any possible initial
strategy, then allow fitness to dictate the ensuing adaptations. This process
would involve successful strategies to reproduce with random mutation, while
unsuccessful strategies would attempt to adapt towards the more successful
strategies. This mechanism of change would likely map well to the real world,
where individuals tend to adapt the behaviour patterns of those more successful
than them and reject the patterns of those less so.
Another way to extend the results of this model would be to incorporate
a level of random error within the strategies. This error would represent the
possibility of a miscommunication, or other such occurrence that could affect a
strategy’s implementation in real life. By incorporating this error in a simulation
involving selective pressures, strategies would be forced to reduce unnecessary
complexity or redundancies. Abreu and Rubinstein [1] explored an analytical
method for quantifying and optimizing the complexity of automata in decision-
making games, but the random error approach may provide a more versatile
quantification and assessment of the necessary complexity.
Finally, it is important to note that the analysis in this project covered only
constrained and symmetric bargaining scenarios, where the players had equal
bargaining power (time-discount) and equal knowledge of their opponent. In
the real world, bargainers may possess a range of different preferences over risk
and time, while only certain time preferences and only neutral risk preferences
were discussed here. The results of an automaton selection meta-game may look
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quite different if the players had unique preferences, and this avenue must be
explored to further consolidate the conclusions discussed here.
5.2.2 Applications of the Model
The intent of this project was to develop a clear intuition about the nature of
bargaining strategies in the real world. To validate the analysis performed here,
the results of the project must therefore be confirmed in real-world bargaining
scenarios. To do so, it would be feasible to organize experiments involving
real humans placed in a bargaining situation against an entity employing the
strategies discussed in this project. Furthermore, these experiments could also
simply monitor humans playing against each other in a bargaining game to
verify and improve upon the model for the human bargaining mind.
Should this approach be undertaken, the data gathered from these experi-
ments could be used to validate and enrich the conclusions drawn here about the
nature of real-world bargaining. Using the methods employed in this project,
suitable recommendations on how strategies should be adapted to converge to-
wards the optimal bargaining outcomes. Consequently, the dissemination of
these conclusions could begin to affect how people bargain and improve the
outcomes of bargaining encounters in the real world.
Long-term, should future work in this area provide fruitful, novel bargaining
games could be developed to be analyzed in the classical sense. For example,
should there be a more succinct classification of “types” of bargainers and their
frequency in the real world, the Rubinstein Bargaining model could be analyzed
through Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, tying this whole pursuit back into the
realm of pure Game Theory.
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Appendix A
A.1 Automaton Naming System
Automaton Naming System
First Component Initial Offer Size H→ High
M→ Medium
Lo→ Low
Second Component Tactic HD→ Hawk/Dove
Rea→ Reasonableness
Con→ Constant Concession
T4T→ Tit-For-Tat
Pro→ Prospect Theory
Y→ Yield
Mean→ No Concession
50→ Split-the-Difference
Third Component If #-Pro-#
H→ High Frame
M→ Medium Frame
L→ Low Frame
Otherwise
I→ Increasing Concession Size
D→ Decreasing Concession Size
Fourth Component Concession Rate L→ Linear
E→ Exponential
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A.2 Round-Robin Results
Initial Round-Robin Results δ = 0.93
Rank Name Avg.
Score
Avg.
Time
Avg.
Allo.
1 H-Rea-D-E 45.65 1.4 50.31
2 H-Y 44.11 0.5 45.59
3 Lo-Rea-D-E 44.02 1.2 47.78
4 M-Y 43.95 0.5 45.23
5 Lo-Y 43.81 0.5 45.25
6 H-HD-D-E 42.88 1.4 47.33
7 M-Rea-D-E 42.80 1.8 45.58
8 M-HD-D-E 42.74 1.3 47.02
9 Lo-HD-D-E 42.63 1.2 46.29
10 Lo-T4T 42.57 1.6 47.51
11 Lo-50 42.48 1.4 46.74
12 M-50 42.29 1.8 47.97
13 H-50 41.83 2.3 48.99
14 Lo-Mean 41.03 2.5 47.83
15 Lo-HD-I-L 40.85 2.7 48.75
16 Lo-HD-I-E 40.83 2.7 48.88
17 M-T4T 40.76 3.1 49.80
18 Lo-Rea-I-L 40.75 2.9 49.11
19 Lo-Rea-I-E 40.66 2.9 49.13
20 Lo-HD-D-L 39.83 3.4 49.32
21 M-Con 39.72 3.5 50.08
22 Lo-Pro-L 39.54 3.5 48.12
23 Lo-Rea-D-L 39.32 3.8 49.42
24 M-Mean 39.05 4.4 49.28
25 Lo-Pro-H 38.99 4.1 48.74
26 Lo-Pro-M 38.96 4.1 48.62
27 M-HD-I-L 38.05 4.5 51.00
28 M-HD-I-E 37.85 4.6 51.10
29 M-Rea-I-L 37.53 4.9 51.47
30 M-Rea-I-E 37.06 5.2 51.62
31 SPE 36.77 8.8 46.47
32 H-Mean 36.12 7.1 51.10
33 H-HD-I-L 35.05 6.1 52.28
34 H-HD-I-E 34.92 6.3 52.77
35 M-Pro-L 34.89 7.7 50.88
36 H-Rea-I-L 34.72 6.5 52.81
37 H-T4T 34.49 9.5 47.67
38 M-HD-D-L 34.34 7.2 52.23
39 H-Rea-I-E 34.03 7.0 53.11
40 M-Rea-D-L 33.61 8.1 52.48
41 M-Pro-M 33.52 9.6 50.09
42 M-Pro-H 33.15 9.9 49.94
43 H-HD-D-L 28.85 11.5 54.42
44 H-Pro-L 28.56 14.1 52.86
45 H-Rea-D-L 27.91 12.9 54.58
46 H-Pro-M 27.65 15.1 53.18
47 H-Pro-H 26.98 15.5 53.32
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Initial Round-Robin Results δ = 0.95
Rank Name Avg.
Score
Avg.
Time
Avg.
Allo.
1 H-Rea-D-E 46.88 1.4 50.25
2 H-Y 44.53 0.5 45.59
3 M-Y 44.37 0.5 45.43
4 Lo-Y 44.22 0.5 45.25
5 H-HD-D-E 44.05 1.4 47.27
6 M-Rea-D-E 43.87 1.9 48.25
7 M-HD-D-E 43.8 1.4 46.92
8 Lo-Rea-D-E 43.40 1.8 47.44
9 Lo-HD-D-E 43.33 1.2 46.05
10 M-50 43.25 2.0 47.77
11 Lo-50 43.14 1.5 46.35
12 H-50 42.99 2.5 48.63
13 Lo-T4T 42.34 2.5 47.60
14 Lo-Mean 41.41 3.1 47.48
15 Lo-HD-I-L 40.75 3.8 48.62
16 Lo-HD-I-E 40.64 3.9 48.60
17 Lo-Rea-I-L 40.43 4.1 48.80
18 Lo-Rea-I-E 40.21 4.4 48.91
19 M-T4T 40.20 4.9 48.86
20 M-Con 40.18 4.8 50.45
21 Lo-Pro-L 39.77 4.7 48.13
22 M-Mean 39.56 5.7 49.57
23 Lo-HD-D-L 39.47 5.0 49.10
24 Lo-Pro-M 39.16 5.4 48.47
25 Lo-Rea-D-L 38.89 5.5 49.24
26 Lo-Pro-H 38.30 6.5 48.16
27 M-HD-I-L 38.02 6.4 51.18
28 M-HD-I-E 37.92 6.6 51.42
29 H-Mean 37.62 8.7 51.07
30 M-Re-I-L 37.28 7.0 51.41
31 M-Rea-I-E 37.12 7.3 51.51
32 H-HD-I-L 36.40 8.1 52.86
33 H-HD-I-E 35.96 8.5 53.13
34 SPE 35.91 11.4 45.87
35 H-Rea-I-L 35.58 8.9 53.35
36 M-Pro-L 35.57 9.8 51.28
37 H-Rea-I-E 35.24 9.4 53.53
38 H-T4T 34.78 11.3 47.69
39 M-HD-D-L 34.28 9.9 52.07
40 M-Pro-M 34.04 12.1 50.34
41 M-Rea-D-L 33.41 11.2 51.85
42 M-Pro-H 33.4 12.7 50.52
43 H-Pro-L 30.91 16.1 53.51
44 H-HD-DL 30.26 14.5 54.35
45 H-Pro-M 29.13 18.4 52.75
46 H-Rea-D-L 29.07 16.6 53.66
47 H-Pro-H 27.8 20.2 52.48
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Initial Round-Robin Results δ = 0.97
Rank Name Avg.
Score
Avg.
Time
Avg.
Allo.
1 H-Rea-D-E 45.38 2.8 49.09
2 H-HD-D-E 45.15 2.0 47.91
3 H-Y 44.95 0.5 45.59
4 M-HD-D-E 44.93 1.7 47.20
5 H-50 44.82 2.7 48.46
6 M-Rea-D-E 44.80 2.6 48.09
7 M-Y 44.79 0.5 45.43
8 M-50 44.71 2.1 47.56
9 Lo-Y 44.64 0.5 45.26
10 Lo-HD-D-E 44.39 1.2 46.03
11 Lo-50 44.14 1.9 46.60
12 Lo-Rea-D-E 43.47 3.4 46.87
13 Lo-Mean 42.73 4.0 47.45
14 Lo-T4T 42.40 4.3 47.61
15 Lo-Pro-L 41.68 5.4 47.98
16 Lo-HD-I-L 41.42 5.8 48.51
17 M-Con 41.36 6.7 50.00
18 Lo-HD-I-E 41.33 5.9 48.55
19 M-Mean 41.24 7.3 49.56
20 Lo-Rea-I-L 41.09 6.3 48.69
21 Lo-Pro-M 40.85 6.9 48.45
22 Lo-Rea-I-E 40.78 6.9 48.81
23 Lo-HD-D-L 40.48 7.1 48.88
24 H-Mean 39.99 10.8 51.04
25 Lo-Rea-D-L 39.92 7.9 49.05
26 M-T4T 39.78 8.5 48.53
27 Lo-Pro-H 39.74 8.4 48.15
28 M-HD-I-L 39.08 9.7 51.25
29 M-HD-I-E 38.89 9.9 51.32
30 M-Pro-L 38.64 11.1 50.90
31 H-HD-I-L 38.51 11.9 53.54
32 M-Rea-I-L 38.43 10.6 51.44
33 H-HD-I-E 38.35 12.2 53.68
34 M-Rea-I-E 38.18 11.0 51.05
35 H-Rea-I-L 37.83 12.9 53.77
36 M-Pro-M 37.44 13.4 51.43
37 H-Rea-I-E 37.42 13.5 53.40
38 H-T4T 37.10 12.9 48.57
39 M-HD-D-L 36.30 13.5 51.95
40 SPE 36.23 14.7 45.72
41 M-Pro-H 35.82 15.8 50.70
42 M-Rea-D-L 35.25 15.3 51.69
43 H-Pro-L 35.04 18.2 52.52
44 H-Pro-M 33.86 20.5 51.41
45 H-HD-D-L 33.32 19.3 54.47
46 H-Rea-D-L 31.97 21.7 53.75
47 H-Pro-H 30.34 25.7 48.76
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A.3 Tournament Re-Run
Thinned Round-Robin Results δ = 0.93
Rank Name Avg.
Score
Avg.
Time
Avg.
Allo.
1 H-Rea-D-E 45.30 1.4 50.00
2 H-Y 45.16 0.5 46.73
3 Lo-Rea-D-E 44.88 1.1 48.46
4 M-Rea-D-E 44.79 1.5 49.69
5 M-50 44.33 1.6 49.68
6 Lo-T4T 44.24 1.2 48.25
7 Lo-Mean 44.22 1.5 49.04
8 M-HD-D-E 44.22 1.3 48.55
9 Lo-50 44.17 1.2 47.99
10 Lo-HD-D-E 44.16 1.1 47.70
11 Lo-HD-I-L 43.94 1.7 49.47
12 M-T4T 43.89 2.1 50.61
13 Lo-HD-D-L 43.80 1.9 49.72
14 Lo-Pro-L 43.74 1.7 48.72
15 Lo-Rea-D-L 43.68 2.0 49.76
16 Lo-Pro-M 43.67 2.0 49.47
17 Lo-Pro-H 43.65 2.0 49.48
18 H-50 43.53 2.1 50.45
19 M-Mean 43.19 2.6 50.60
20 SPE 43.09 3.4 49.39
21 M-HD-I-L 41.99 3.4 52.56
22 M-Pro-L 40.78 4.2 51.59
23 M-HD-D-L 39.71 4.8 53.23
24 M-Pro-M 39.55 6.0 50.84
25 H-Mean 39.07 5.7 52.47
26 H-HD-I-L 37.89 5.3 53.61
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Thinned Round-Robin Results δ = 0.95
Rank Name Avg.
Score
Avg.
Time
Avg.
Allo.
1 H-Rea-D-E 46.56 1.4 49.98
2 M-Rea-D-E 45.82 1.5 49.46
3 H-Y 45.61 0.5 46.73
4 M-50 45.30 1.7 49.37
5 M-HD-D-E 45.21 1.3 48.41
6 Lo-Rea-D-E 45.15 1.3 48.21
7 Lo-50 44.88 1.2 47.73
8 H-50 44.83 2.3 50.22
9 Lo-HD-D-E 44.79 1.1 47.44
10 Lo-T4T 44.79 1.6 48.45
11 Lo-Mean 44.75 1.8 48.78
12 Lo-HD-I-L 44.28 2.3 49.48
13 Lo-Pro-L 44.13 2.3 49.07
14 Lo-Pro-M 44.02 2.6 49.31
15 Lo-HD-D-L 43.86 2.7 49.61
16 Lo-Pro-H 43.75 2.8 49.48
17 Lo-Rea-D-L 43.68 2.8 49.68
18 M-Mean 43.56 3.6 51.18
19 M-T4T 43.35 3.9 49.38
20 SPE 42.47 5.4 48.30
21 M-HD-I-L 41.73 5.0 52.71
22 M-Pro-L 41.38 5.6 52.29
23 H-Mean 40.49 7.0 52.43
24 M-Pro-M 39.83 7.6 51.35
25 H-HD-I-L 39.24 6.9 54.12
26 M-HD-D-L 39.10 6.9 52.99
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Thinned Round-Robin Results δ = 0.97
Rank Name Avg.
Score
Avg.
Time
Avg.
Allo.
1 H-Rea-D-E 47.20 2.0 50.04
2 M-Rea-D-E 46.90 1.7 49.27
3 M-50 46.62 1.8 49.20
4 H-50 46.62 2.4 50.10
5 M-HD-D-E 46.30 1.5 48.46
6 Lo-Rea-D-E 46.14 1.6 48.40
7 H-Y 46.06 0.5 46.73
8 Lo-50 45.99 1.5 48.04
9 Lo-HD-D-E 45.82 1.1 47.41
10 Lo-Mean 45.78 2.2 48.66
11 Lo-T4T 45.37 2.4 48.56
12 Lo-Pro-L 45.19 2.9 48.90
13 Lo-Pro-M 45.03 3.4 49.23
14 Lo-HD-I-L 44.86 3.5 49.37
15 M-Mean 44.83 4.8 51.08
16 Lo-Pro-H 44.71 3.8 49.36
17 Lo-HD-D-L 44.52 3.9 49.50
18 Lo-Rea-D-L 44.28 4.2 49.59
19 M-Pro-L 43.45 6.5 51.88
20 H-Mean 42.81 8.8 52.45
21 M-Pro-M 42.72 7.9 52.33
22 M-T4T 42.63 7.2 48.88
23 SPE 42.61 7.2 48.08
24 M-HD-I-L 42.43 7.7 52.62
25 H-HD-I-L 41.44 10.3 55.10
26 M-HD-D-L 40.45 10.1 52.91
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Figure A.1: Standard Deviation Algorithm Simulation δ = 0.93
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Figure A.2: Filtered Ecological Simulation δ = 0.93
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A.4 Ecological Tournament Results
Ecological Simulation Final Results δ = 0.93
Rank Name Final Population Size Generation Died Out
1 SPE 487 ∞
2 H-Y 0 45
3 M-Mean 0 33
4 M-50 0 32
4 M-T4T 0 32
6 M-Rea-D-E 0 31
7 Lo-Mean 0 25
7 Lo-Pro-H 0 25
7 Lo-Rea-D-L 0 25
7 Lo-HD-D-L 0 25
7 Lo-HD-I-L 0 25
12 Lo-Pro-M 0 24
13 Lo-Rea-D-E 0 23
13 Lo-T4T 0 23
13 Lo-Pro-L 0 23
13 Lo-50 0 23
17 M-HD-D-E 0 58 (Filtering)
18 H-Rea-D-E 0 51 (Filtering)
19 Lo-HD-D-E 0 26 (Filtering)
20 H-50 0 24 (Filtering)
20 M-Pro-L 0 24 (Filtering)
22 M-HD-I-L 0 20 (Filtering)
23 H-Mean 0 13 (Filtering)
23 M-Pro-M 0 13 (Filtering)
23 M-HD-D-L 0 13 (Filtering)
23 H-HD-I-L 0 13 (Filtering)
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Figure A.3: Standard Deviation Algorithm Simulation δ = 0.95
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Figure A.4: Filtered Ecological Simulation δ = 0.95
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Ecological Simulation Final Results δ = 0.95
Rank Name Final Population Size Generation Died Out
1 Lo-Mean 55 ∞
2 Lo-HD-I-L 53 ∞
3 Lo-HD-D-L 52 ∞
4 Lo-Rea-D-L 48 ∞
5 Lo-Pro-H 47 ∞
5 Lo-Pro-M 47 ∞
7 Lo-Pro-L 43 ∞
8 Lo-Rea-D-E 23 ∞
9 M-50 0 37
10 M-T4T 0 36
11 M-Rea-D-E 0 31
12 M-HD-D-E 0 31
13 M-Mean 0 11
14 H-Rea-D-E 0 55 (Filtering)
15 H-50 0 38 (Filtering)
16 M-Pro-L 0 34 (Filtering)
17 M-Pro-M 0 31 (Filtering)
18 H-Y 0 28 (Filtering)
19 Lo-50 0 26 (Filtering)
19 Lo-T4T 0 26 (Filtering)
21 Lo-HD-D-E 0 23 (Filtering)
22 H-HD-I-L 0 13 (Filtering)
22 M-HD-I-L 0 13 (Filtering)
22 M-HD-D-L 0 13 (Filtering)
22 H-Mean 0 13 (Filtering)
22 SPE 0 13 (Filtering)
A.4. ECOLOGICAL TOURNAMENT RESULTS 105
Figure A.5: Standard Deviation Algorithm Simulation δ = 0.97
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Figure A.6: Filtered Ecological Simulation δ = 0.97
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Ecological Simulation Final Results δ = 0.97
Rank Name Final Population Size Generation Died Out
1 Lo-Mean 64 ∞
2 Lo-HD-I-L 61 ∞
3 Lo-Pro-M 56 ∞
4 Lo-Pro-H 50 ∞
5 Lo-HD-D-L 47 ∞
6 Lo-Pro-L 45 ∞
7 Lo-Rea-D-E 11 ∞
8 M-50 0 66
9 M-Rea-D-E 0 53
10 H-Rea-D-E 0 32
11 H-50 0 24
12 M-Mean 0 18
13 Lo-Rea-D-L 0 50 (Filtering)
14 SPE 0 47 (Filtering)
15 M-HD-D-E 0 33 (Filtering)
16 M-Pro-L 0 28 (Filtering)
17 Lo-50 0 26 (Filtering)
18 H-Y 0 23(Filtering)
18 Lo-T4T 0 23(Filtering)
18 Lo-HD-D-E 0 23(Filtering)
21 M-Pro-M 0 22 (Filtering)
22 H-Mean 0 13 (Filtering)
22 M-T4T 0 13 (Filtering)
22 M-HD-D-L 0 13 (Filtering)
22 M-HD-I-L 0 13 (Filtering)
22 H-HD-I-L 0 13 (Filtering)
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Appendix B
B.1 Automaton Code
f unc t i on [ o f f e r , acceptance ]=Master Automaton ( automaton , ledger , k , d)
%automaton r ep r e s en t s the I .D. number o f the automaton r e c e i v i n g an o f f e r
%l edge r prov ides the h i s t o ry o f o f f e r s in t h i s game
%k rep r e s en t s the t o t a l number o f o f f e r s made so f a r in the game
%d i s the d i scount f a c t o r
acceptance=0; %de f au l t acceptance cond i t i on i s o f f
s =0.25; %conce s s i on s c a l e r
% i c r a t e =1/5; %old
% d c r a t e =1/8;
% d adjus t =5/8;
i c r a t e=1−d ; %conce s s i on func t i on s inco rpora t e d i scount f a c t o r
d c r a t e =0.05/d ;
d ad jus t=min (0 . 5/d , 1 5/16 ) ;
min con=1/16;
med con=0.5;
r e f h i g h =50;
ref med=45;
r e f l ow =40;
p t s l op e h i gh =0.035;
pt s lope med =0.0389;
p t s l op e l ow =0.0437;
p t t r an s h i gh =−1.25;
pt trans med=−1.2504;
p t t r an s l ow =−1.2485;
max risk =0.75;
l o g s c a l e =2;
i o decay =6;
high=60;
medium=55;
low=50;
frame=45;
i f automaton==1 %H−HD−I−L
IO=high ;
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i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==2 %H−HD−D−L
IO=high ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
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e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==3 %M−HD−I−L
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
112 APPENDIX B.
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==4 %M−HD−D−L
IO=medium ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
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acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==5 %Lo−HD−I−L
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
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%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==6 %Lo−HD−D−L
IO=low ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
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acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==7 %H−Rea−I−L
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
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i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==8 %H−Rea−D−L
IO=high ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
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i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==9 %M−Rea−I−L
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
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i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==10 %M−Rea−D−L
IO=medium ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
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i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==11 %Lo−Rea−I−L
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e ∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
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i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==12 %Lo−Rea−D−L
IO=low ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=max(min con ,−( c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e+d adjus t ))∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
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i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==13 %H−HD−I−E
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==14 %H−HD−D−E
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IO=high ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==15 %M−HD−I−E
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
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acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==16 %M−HD−D−E
IO=medium ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
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i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==17 %Lo−HD−I−E
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
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acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==18 %Lo−HD−D−E
IO=low ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)< conce s s i on %hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f c e i l ( k/2)>1
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)< conce s s i on
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%hawk−dove
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1− s ) ;
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==19 %H−Rea−I−E
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
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end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==20 %H−Rea−D−E
IO=high ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
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end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==21 %M−Rea−I−E
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
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end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==22 %M−Rea−D−E
IO=medium ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
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end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==23 %Lo−Rea−I−E
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=(−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ i c r a t e )+1)∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
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end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==24 %Lo−Rea−D−E
IO=low ;
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0 %mechanics o f f i r s t o f f e r , whether p layer 1 or 2
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,2)>IO %firmness , r eac t to t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end−1 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−1,2)<( l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end−2 ,2))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,2)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ; %i f they are making sma l l e r conces s ions , make l a r g e r conce s s i on s
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
e l s e
conce s s i on=exp(− c e i l ( k/2)∗ d c r a t e ∗ l o g s c a l e )∗ abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f l edge r (1 ,1)>IO %firmness , check t h e i r IO
conce s s i on=conce s s i on∗(1−exp(− c e i l ( k/2)/ io decay )∗ s ) ;
end
i f k>4
i f ( l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end−1 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−1,1)<( l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end−2 ,1))/ l edge r ( end−2 ,1)
conce s s i on=conce s s i on ∗(1+s ) ;
132 APPENDIX B.
end
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
i f o f f e r<frame
o f f e r=l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==25 %M−Con
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=s∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=s∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==26 %H−T4T
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
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end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=med con∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f k>2
conce s s i on=l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=med con∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f k>2
conce s s i on=l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==27 %M−T4T
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=med con∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f k>2
conce s s i on=l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=med con∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f k>2
conce s s i on=l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
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i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==28 %Lo−T4T
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=med con∗abs ( l edge r ( end ,1)−(100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ) ; %de f i n e bas i c conce s s i on behaviour
i f k>2
conce s s i on=l edge r ( end−1,2)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=med con∗abs ( l edge r ( end−1,2)−(100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ) ;
i f k>2
conce s s i on=l edge r ( end−1,1)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==29 %H−Pro−H
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
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end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f h i g h
conce s s i on=pt s l op e h i gh ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt t r an s h i gh ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f h i g h
conce s s i on=pt s l op e h i gh ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt t r an s h i gh ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==30 %M−Pro−H
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f h i g h
conce s s i on=pt s l op e h i gh ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt t r an s h i gh ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f h i g h
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conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f h i g h
conce s s i on=pt s l op e h i gh ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt t r an s h i gh ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==31 %Lo−Pro−H
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f h i g h
conce s s i on=pt s l op e h i gh ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt t r an s h i gh ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
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o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f h i g h
conce s s i on=pt s l op e h i gh ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt t r an s h i gh ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f h i g h
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==32 %H−Pro−M
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=ref med
conce s s i on=pt s lope med ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt trans med ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=ref med
conce s s i on=pt s lope med ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt trans med ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ ref med
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conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==33 %M−Pro−M
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=ref med
conce s s i on=pt s lope med ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt trans med ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=ref med
conce s s i on=pt s lope med ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt trans med ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
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o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==34 %Lo−Pro−M
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=ref med
conce s s i on=pt s lope med ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt trans med ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=ref med
conce s s i on=pt s lope med ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt trans med ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ ref med
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==35 %H−Pro−L
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
140 APPENDIX B.
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f l ow
conce s s i on=pt s l ope l ow ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt t ran s l ow ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f l ow
conce s s i on=pt s l ope l ow ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt t ran s l ow ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==36 %M−Pro−L
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
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i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f l ow
conce s s i on=pt s l ope l ow ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt t ran s l ow ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f l ow
conce s s i on=pt s l ope l ow ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt t ran s l ow ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==37 %Lo−ProL
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f l ow
conce s s i on=pt s l ope l ow ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,2))+ pt t ran s l ow ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,2))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
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conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<=re f l ow
conce s s i on=pt s l ope l ow ∗(100− l edge r ( end ,1))+ pt t ran s l ow ;
e l s e i f (100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) )∗ dˆk<1/max risk∗ r e f l ow
conce s s i on=−exp((100− l edge r ( end ,1))/20 −2 .5)+1.5 ;
e l s e
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
end
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on )∗d %i f not f i r s t o f f e r , p layer checks whther i t i s b e t t e r o f f to
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end−1,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==38 %H−Y
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==39 %M−Y
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
end
e l s e
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i f mod(k,2)==1
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==40 %Lo−Y
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==41 %H−Mean
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
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end
end
e l s e i f automaton==42 %M−Mean
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==43 %Lo−Mean
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=min con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ;
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i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==44 %H−50
IO=high ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=med con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=med con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==45 %M−50
IO=medium ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=med con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
146 APPENDIX B.
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=med con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==46 %Lo−50
IO=low ;
i f k==0 %i n i t i a l o f f e r check
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
o f f e r=IO ;
e l s e i f 100− l edge r (1 ,1)>IO
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=IO ;
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1 %i f p layer 1
conce s s i on=med con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,2)− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,2)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,1)− conce s s i on ;
end
e l s e %i f p layer 2
conce s s i on=med con∗abs (100− l edge r ( end ,1)− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ) ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end ,1)+1>=( l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on )∗d
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=l edge r ( end ,2)− conce s s i on ;
end
end
end
e l s e i f automaton==47 %SPE
i f k==0
i f l edge r (1 ,1)==0
on l y o f f e r =1/(1+d )∗100 ;
o f f e r=on l y o f f e r ;
e l s e
o n l y o f f e r=d/(1+d )∗100 ;
i f 100− l edge r (1,1)+1>= on l y o f f e r
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( 1 , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
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e l s e
o f f e r=on l y o f f e r ;
end
end
e l s e
i f mod(k,2)==1
on l y o f f e r =1/(1+d )∗100 ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end,2)+1>=on l y o f f e r
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=on l y o f f e r ;
end
e l s e
o n l y o f f e r=d/(1+d )∗100 ;
i f 100− l edge r ( end,1)+1>=on l y o f f e r
o f f e r=100− l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
acceptance=1;
e l s e
o f f e r=on l y o f f e r ;
end
end
end
end
end
B.2 Round Robin Tournament Code
n=47;
%n r ep r e s en t s the number o f automata to be invo lved
% p=1/10;
%p r ep r e s en t s the p r obab i l i t y o f breakdown a f t e r each r e j e c t e d o f f e r .
% Risk o f breakdown i s cu r r en t l y commented out f o r round robin
k=0;
%i n i t i a l i z e count va r i ab l e
d=0.95;
%discount fac tor , a rb i t r a r y r i gh t now
cu t o f f =64;
%l im i t s the maximum number o f rounds to prevent i n f i n i t e loops with
%i n s i g n i f i c a n t outcomes
r e s u l t s=ze ro s (n , 6 , n ) ;
%r e s u l t s conta ins the t o t a l u t i l i t y accumulated by each automaton in each
%matchup , and how many turns i t l a s t ed
t o t a l s=ze ro s (n , 3 ) ;
%i n i t i a l i z e an array that t racks the t o t a l u t i l i t y gained by each automaton
%,number o f turns taken to get there , d i scounted t o t a l
l edge r=ze ro s ( 1 , 3 ) ;
%i n i t i a l i z e l edge r
f o r i =1:n
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f o r j =1:n
[ i n i t i a l i , y]=Master Automaton ( i , l edger , k , d ) ;
f i r s t o f f e r =[ i n i t i a l i , y ] ;
l edge r =[ f i r s t o f f e r ( 1 ) , 0 , 0 ] ;
[ i n i t i a l j , y]=Master Automaton ( j , l edger , k , d ) ;
s e c ond o f f e r =[ i n i t i a l j , y ] ;
l edge r =[ f i r s t o f f e r (1 ) , s e c ond o f f e r (1 ) , s e c ond o f f e r ( 2 ) ] ;
whi le l edge r ( end ,3)==0
% i f u>p
k=k+1;
i f mod(k,2)==1
[ o f f e r , y]=Master Automaton ( i , l edger , k , d ) ;
newof fe r=[ o f f e r , y ] ;
l edge r =[ l edge r ; newof fe r (1) ,100− newof fe r (1 ) , newof fe r ( 2 ) ] ;
e l s e
[ o f f e r , y]=Master Automaton ( j , l edger , k , d ) ;
newof fe r=[ o f f e r , y ] ;
l edge r ( end ,2)= newof fe r ( 1 ) ;
l edge r ( end ,3)= newof fe r ( 2 ) ;
end
% u=rand ;
% e l s e
% l edge r =[ l edge r ; 0 , 0 , 1 ] ;
% end
i f k>=cu t o f f
l edge r = [0 , 0 , 1 ] ;
end
end
r e s u l t s ( j , 1 , i )= l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s ( j , 2 , i )=k ;
r e s u l t s ( j , 3 , i )= r e s u l t s ( j , 1 , i )∗dˆ r e s u l t s ( j , 2 , i ) ;
%(end , 1 ) because t h i s f o r loop c r e a t e s each matchup where the
%p r i n c i p a l automaton i s p layer 1 . Wil l need to run again with him as
%player 2
l edge r=ze ro s ( 1 , 3 ) ;
%wipes l edge r a f t e r each game
k=0;
%r e s e t count
end
% t o t a l s ( i )=[sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 1 , i ) ) , sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 2 , i ) ) ] ;
t o t a l s ( i ,1)=sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 1 , i ) ) ;
t o t a l s ( i ,2)=sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 2 , i ) ) ;
t o t a l s ( i ,3)=sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 3 , i ) ) ;
%sums r e s u l t s f o r each automaton from each matchup i t had
end
f o r i =1:n
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f o r j =1:n
[ i n i t i a l j , y]=Master Automaton ( j , l edger , k , d ) ;
f i r s t o f f e r =[ i n i t i a l j , y ] ;
l edge r =[ f i r s t o f f e r ( 1 ) , 0 , 0 ] ;
[ i n i t i a l i , y]=Master Automaton ( i , l edger , k , d ) ;
s e c ond o f f e r =[ i n i t i a l i , y ] ;
l edge r =[ f i r s t o f f e r (1 ) , s e c ond o f f e r (1 ) , s e c ond o f f e r ( 2 ) ] ;
%i n i t i a l i z e l edge r f o r t h i s matchup
%column three r ep r e s en t s the acceptance condit ion , 0 i s not accpeted ,
%1 i s accepted o f f e r
whi le l edge r ( end ,3)==0
% i f u>p
k=k+1;
i f mod(k,2)==1
[ o f f e r , y]=Master Automaton ( j , l edger , k , d ) ;
newof fe r=[ o f f e r , y ] ;
l edge r =[ l edge r ; newof fe r (1) ,100− newof fe r (1 ) , newof fe r ( 2 ) ] ;
e l s e
[ o f f e r , y]=Master Automaton ( i , l edger , k , d ) ;
newof fe r=[ o f f e r , y ] ;
l edge r ( end ,2)= newof fe r ( 1 ) ;
l edge r ( end ,3)= newof fe r ( 2 ) ;
end
% u=rand ;
% e l s e
% l edge r =[ l edge r ; 0 , 0 , 1 ] ;
% end
i f k>=cu t o f f
l edge r = [0 , 0 , 1 ] ;
end
end
r e s u l t s ( j , 4 , i )= l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
r e s u l t s ( j , 5 , i )=k ;
r e s u l t s ( j , 6 , i )= r e s u l t s ( j , 4 , i )∗dˆ r e s u l t s ( j , 5 , i ) ;
l edge r=ze ro s ( 1 , 3 ) ;
k=0;
end
t o t a l s ( i ,1)= t o t a l s ( i ,1)+sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 4 , i ) ) ;
t o t a l s ( i ,2)= t o t a l s ( i ,2)+sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 5 , i ) ) ;
t o t a l s ( i ,3)= t o t a l s ( i ,3)+sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 6 , i ) ) ;
end
average=t o t a l s /(2∗n)
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B.3 Ecological Tournament Algorithm
f unc t i on [ n , r e s u l t s ]=Arena ( run )
n=47;
k=0;
d=0.95;
c u t o f f =64;
r e s u l t s=ze ro s (n , 6 , n ) ;
t o t a l s=ze ro s (n , 3 ) ;
l edge r=ze ro s ( 1 , 3 ) ;
i f run==1
f o r i =1:n
f o r j =1:n
[ i n i t i a l i , y]=Master Automaton ( i , l edger , k , d ) ;
f i r s t o f f e r =[ i n i t i a l i , y ] ;
l edge r =[ f i r s t o f f e r ( 1 ) , 0 , 0 ] ;
[ i n i t i a l j , y]=Master Automaton ( j , l edger , k , d ) ;
s e c ond o f f e r =[ i n i t i a l j , y ] ;
l edge r =[ f i r s t o f f e r (1 ) , s e c ond o f f e r (1 ) , s e c ond o f f e r ( 2 ) ] ;
whi le l edge r ( end ,3)==0
k=k+1;
i f mod(k,2)==1
[ o f f e r , y]=Master Automaton ( i , l edger , k , d ) ;
newof fe r=[ o f f e r , y ] ;
l edge r =[ l edge r ; newof fe r (1) ,100− newof fe r (1 ) , newof fe r ( 2 ) ] ;
e l s e
[ o f f e r , y]=Master Automaton ( j , l edger , k , d ) ;
newof fe r=[ o f f e r , y ] ;
l edge r ( end ,2)= newof fe r ( 1 ) ;
l edge r ( end ,3)= newof fe r ( 2 ) ;
end
i f k>=cu t o f f
l edge r = [0 , 0 , 1 ] ;
end
end
r e s u l t s ( j , 1 , i )= l edge r ( end , 1 ) ;
r e s u l t s ( j , 2 , i )=k ;
r e s u l t s ( j , 3 , i )= r e s u l t s ( j , 1 , i )∗dˆ r e s u l t s ( j , 2 , i ) ;
l edge r=ze ro s ( 1 , 3 ) ;
k=0;
end
t o t a l s ( i ,1)=sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 1 , i ) ) ;
t o t a l s ( i ,2)=sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 2 , i ) ) ;
t o t a l s ( i ,3)=sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 3 , i ) ) ;
end
f o r i =1:n
f o r j =1:n
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[ i n i t i a l j , y]=Master Automaton ( j , l edger , k , d ) ;
f i r s t o f f e r =[ i n i t i a l j , y ] ;
l edge r =[ f i r s t o f f e r ( 1 ) , 0 , 0 ] ;
[ i n i t i a l i , y]=Master Automaton ( i , l edger , k , d ) ;
s e c ond o f f e r =[ i n i t i a l i , y ] ;
l edge r =[ f i r s t o f f e r (1 ) , s e c ond o f f e r (1 ) , s e c ond o f f e r ( 2 ) ] ;
whi le l edge r ( end ,3)==0
k=k+1;
i f mod(k,2)==1
[ o f f e r , y]=Master Automaton ( j , l edger , k , d ) ;
newof fe r=[ o f f e r , y ] ;
l edge r =[ l edge r ; newof fe r (1) ,100− newof fe r (1 ) , newof fe r ( 2 ) ] ;
e l s e
[ o f f e r , y]=Master Automaton ( i , l edger , k , d ) ;
newof fe r=[ o f f e r , y ] ;
l edge r ( end ,2)= newof fe r ( 1 ) ;
l edge r ( end ,3)= newof fe r ( 2 ) ;
end
i f k>=cu t o f f
l edge r = [0 , 0 , 1 ] ;
end
end
r e s u l t s ( j , 4 , i )= l edge r ( end , 2 ) ;
r e s u l t s ( j , 5 , i )=k ;
r e s u l t s ( j , 6 , i )= r e s u l t s ( j , 4 , i )∗dˆ r e s u l t s ( j , 5 , i ) ;
l edge r=ze ro s ( 1 , 3 ) ;
k=0;
end
t o t a l s ( i ,1)= t o t a l s ( i ,1)+sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 4 , i ) ) ;
t o t a l s ( i ,2)= t o t a l s ( i ,2)+sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 5 , i ) ) ;
t o t a l s ( i ,3)= t o t a l s ( i ,3)+sum( r e s u l t s ( : , 6 , i ) ) ;
end
end
end
[ n , r e s u l t s ]=Arena ( 1 ) ;
g=300; %number o f gene ra t i ons
i p =10; %i n i t i a l populat ion s i z e f o r each automaton
de l t a =0.2; %f r a c t i o n o f populat ion change
populat ion=zero s (n , g ) ; %record o f populationm numbers through en t i r e h i s t o ry
populat ion ( : ,1)= i p ; %i n i t i a l system populat ion
weight=ze ro s (n , g ) ; %weight o f r e s u l t s from each matchup
f=ze ro s (n , g ) ; %t o t a l f i t n e s s o f each automaton
w f=ze ro s (n , g ) ; %weighted average f i t n e s s
f b a r=ze ro s (1 , g ) ; %average f i t n e s s ac ro s s every generat ion
m in f i t=ze ro s (1 , g ) ; %ca l c u l a t e miminum f i t n e s s at each generat ion
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f o r i =1:g
f o r j =1:n
weight ( j , i )=populat ion ( j , i )/sum( populat ion ( : , i ) ) ;
end
f o r j =1:n
f o r k=1:n
i f populat ion ( j , i )>0
f ( j , i )= f ( j , i )+weight (k , i )∗( r e s u l t s (k , 3 , j )+ r e s u l t s (k , 6 , j ) ) / 2 ;
end
end
w f ( j , i )=weight ( j , i )∗ f ( j , i ) ;
end
f ba r ( i )=sum( w f ( : , i ) ) ;
f o r j =1:n
% propor t i ona l populat ion algor i thm
populat ion ( j , i+1)=max(0 , n∗ i p ∗w f ( j , i )/sum( w f ( : , i ) ) ) ;
i f populat ion ( j , i +1)<0.5
populat ion ( j , i +1)=0;
end
% std algor i thm
% i f f ( j , i )>= f ba r ( i )+std ( f ( : , i )˜=0)
% populat ion ( j , i+1)=max(0 , populat ion ( j , i )+1);
% e l s e i f f ( j , i )<=f ba r ( i )−std ( f ( : , i )˜=0)
% populat ion ( j , i+1)=max(0 , populat ion ( j , i )−1);
% e l s e
% populat ion ( j , i+1)=max(0 , populat ion ( j , i ) ) ;
% end
% de l ta f r a c t i o n algor i thm
% populat ion ( j , i+1)=max(0 , populat ion ( j , i )+de l ta ∗( f ( j , i )− f b a r ( i ))∗ populat ion ( j , i ) ) ;
% i f populat ion ( j , i +1)<0.5
% populat ion ( j , i +1)=0;
% end
end
m in f i t ( i )=60;
f o r j =1:n
i f populat ion ( j , i )>0
i f f ( j )<min f i t ( i )
m in f i t ( i )= f ( j ) ;
end
end
end
end
hold on
f i g u r e (1)
p lo t ( populat ion ’ )
p lo t ( f bar , ’−− ’)
p l o t ( min f i t , ’ : ’ )
t i t l e ( ’ Eco l og i c a l Study ’ )
x l abe l ( ’ Generation ’ )
y l abe l ( ’ Populat ion Size ’ )
% legend ( ’ Populat ion Size ’ , ’ Average Fitness ’ , ’Minimum Fitness ’ )
hold o f f
